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NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE
Abstract
The Syrian Civil War (2011-present) is one of the great humanitarian disasters of
the modern age. The unprecedented involvement of foreign volunteers in the conflict, the
complex and multi-layered nature of the war, and the allegations of war crimes against
nearly all participants have made the conflict convoluted and complicated. If Syrians are
to ever move on from the barbarism of this war, there must be a transitional justice
process that addresses the wrongs committed against them. While transitional justice is
an ever-evolving practice, it faces unique challenges in the Syrian theater. This thesis
seeks to analyze and suggest possible post-conflict scenarios for a war with no clear end
in sight, which involves thousands of citizens from around the world participating in
alleged war crimes. The Syrian conflict requires a unique iteration of transitional justice
in order to instill and maintain peace, as well as deter future mobilizations of massive
foreign fighter forces.

Keywords: Syria, foreign fighters, transitional justice, truth commissions,
extradition, war crimes, reconciliation, restorative.
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Chapter I: Introduction & Methodology
A. Introduction
Syria is in the midst of a civil war that began in March of 2011. It is partly the
result of the destabilizing Arab Spring movement that swept through the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA). The initial protests against the government of Bashar al-Assad
were soon met with a violent crackdown by regime forces, rapidly escalating the protest
movement into that of an armed rebellion. As the conflict escalates, the forces involved
are become increasingly stratified along sectarian and political lines which have calcified
justifications for why and how the fighting continues. There are various actors present in
the conflict, including, but not limited to, forces loyal to the Assad regime, the Syrian
Kurds (YPG), the Free Syrian Army (FSA), numerous independent militias, Jabhat alNusra Front (an al-Qaeda affiliate), and the Islamic State group (hereafter, ISIS). The
latter two forces have taken advantage of the destabilized nature of the state and its
porous borders, seeking an opportunity to establish a foothold for their respective
ideologies through the use of a diverse fighting force.
With a multi-actor civil war, human rights atrocities, and the inundation of foreign
fighters, the situation in Syria has become exceedingly complex. While the complete
picture is impossible to obtain in a war that is so convoluted, the presence of thousands of
foreign actors has created a situation wherein a global war is being played out on a local
stage. This influx of foreign fighters, in concert with the murky ethical practices within
the conflict, has posed substantial questions about what justice will mean in a postconflict Syria. Never before has the world seen such an expansive and geographically
diverse coalition of extranational fighters engaged in a single regional or state conflict.
5
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This inundation has roused complex questions about what the nature of post-conflict
justice will entail when addressing an absence of many perpetrators who have since
returned home from the battlefield of such a labyrinthine war.
As mass atrocities have been perpetrated upon various groups and individuals by
numerous parties to the conflict, the scars upon Syria’s geographic, institutional, and
human landscape are deepening. In order for a society to transition successfully from a
state of post-conflict destruction to a state of stabilization, productivity, and normalcy, it
must engage in restorative measures. This is a process commonly known as transitional
justice. Through transitional justice, societies are able to address the brutality of their
experience, discover the truth about what occurred, compensate victims, punish
perpetrators, engage in institutional reforms, and move forward without the threat of a
reignition of violence. As Syria moves through this period of violence, considerations
must be made for how post-conflict restoration and reconstruction will be undertaken.
Special consideration for this process must be given to the history of Syrian institutions
and customs, as well as the ever-evolving field of transitional justice itself. While some
methods have been developed in recent years to address the contemporary nature of
violence involving non-state actors, heretofore the issue of large-scale, geographically
diverse foreign fighter involvement has not been significantly addressed. Without further
strategic development to address the absence of foreign fighters who have returned to
their countries of origin after engagement in Syria the post-conflict transitional justice
process in Syria will be incomplete, and therefore may be rendered largely ineffective or
even a complete failure outright.
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B. Research Question
After examining the scope of Syria’s conflict, the breadth of foreign fighter
involvement, and the established methods of transitional justice, it is clear that the issue
of post-conflict restoration is going to be as complex as it is necessary. While prior
research has examined both the issue of foreign fighters as well as post-conflict
transitional justice, the implications that the former have on the latter in post-war Syria
has seen little substantial consideration. Due to this gap in understanding, this thesis will
attempt to answer the following questions: Are the current international frameworks
effective enough to fundamentally address the problem of absent foreign fighters in
Syria’s transitional justice endeavor, and if not, what methods should be undertaken to
ensure a complete and successful transitional justice process? By answering these
questions this thesis will contribute to the development of approaches and strategies
regarding what the transitional justice process in Syria should look like in the scope of an
ever-evolving and intricate topic. Sooner, rather than later, it is hoped that the war in
Syria will come to a close, and this research may be utilized to aid the creation of a wellrounded and effective implementation of transitional justice.
As a result of the novelty of many of the concepts in this research, it is important
to define certain key terms in order to better facilitate comprehensive understanding.
This thesis will utilize the definitions and understandings delineated by the International
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the work of Sandra Kraehenmann. In an effort
to retain clarity, consistency, and understanding, I will be utilizing their classifications as
my foundation.
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Foreign Fighter: “A foreign fighter is an individual who leaves his or her country
of origin or habitual residence to join a non-state armed group in an armed
conflict abroad and who is primarily motivated by ideology, religion, and/or
kinship” (Kraehenmann, 2014).
Transitional Justice: “Transitional justice is a response to systematic or
widespread violations of human rights. It seeks recognition for victims and
promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. Transitional
justice is not a special form of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming
themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuse” (ICTJ, 2009).
Truth Commissions: “These commissions of inquiry have the primary purposes of
investigating and reporting on key periods of recent abuse. They are often ofﬁcial
state bodies that make recommendations to remedy such abuse and to prevent its
recurrence” (ICTJ, 2009).
Criminal Prosecutions: “These are judicial investigations of those responsible for
human rights violations. Prosecutors frequently emphasize investigations of the
‘big ﬁsh’: suspects considered most responsible for massive or systematic crimes”
(ICTJ, 2009).
Reparations Programs: “These are state-sponsored initiatives that help repair the
material and moral damages of past abuse. They typically distribute a mix of
material and symbolic beneﬁts to victims, beneﬁts that may include ﬁnancial
compensation and ofﬁcial apologies” (ICTJ, 2009).
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Gender Justice: “These efforts challenge impunity for sexual and gender-based
violence and ensure women’s equal access to redress of human rights violations”
(ICTJ, 2009).
Institutional Reform: “These efforts seek to transform the military, police,
judiciary and related state institutions from instruments of repression and
corruption into instruments of public service and integrity” (ICTJ, 2009).
Memorialization Initiatives: “These include museums and memorials that
preserve public memory of victims and raise moral consciousness about past
abuse, in order to build a bulwark against its recurrence” (ICTJ, 2009).
The scope of this research will focus solely on the current status of transitional
justice measures in the context of how they may be applied in Syria to address the postconflict reconstruction process. The period in question is limited to that of the current
Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011 and continues through present day. This timeframe will allow for the consideration of several events in the conflict’s timeline,
including the development of ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra Front, and other groups, the evolution
of the foreign fighter element in the region, and the commission of atrocities as defined
by International Humanitarian Law (IHL). All of these elements inform the nature and
makeup of the future post-conflict transitional justice process.
The entirety of this research will be an inductive study focusing on the research
question above. There are several objectives and facilitating guidelines that will aid the
answering of this question:
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1. To curate a rounded understanding of the unique issues in Syria’s civil war and
what that means for the country’s post-conflict process;
2. To develop a thorough understanding of established methods and utilizations of
transitional justice;
3. To address potential pitfalls and gaps in current transitional justice mechanisms,
methods, and policies in the context of Syria’s unique situation and conflict
factors;
4. To formulate recommendations for how to best bridge the gaps in established
thought in order to ensure a complete and satisfactory transitional justice process
in post-conflict Syria.
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C. Methodology
Design
This study will be exclusively qualitative in nature. It will examine pre-existing
and established transitional justice implementations, methods, and theories in an attempt
to ascertain how they might best lend themselves to the post-conflict process in Syria.
This study will also examine treaties, laws, and precedents that have already been
established in the international community that may possibly lend themselves to the cause
of addressing Syria’s foreign fighter problem, and how it relates to transitional justice.
With these two approaches, this thesis will seek to discover methods by which Syria can
address its unique transitional justice challenges, focusing specifically on holding foreign
fighters accountable, with an auxiliary focus on broader transitional justice approaches.
Operationalization
For the purpose of this study, the operational definition for transitional justice will
be taken from the fact sheet issued by ICTJ in 2009, “Transitional justice is a response to
systematic or widespread violations of human rights. It seeks recognition for victims and
promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. Transitional justice is
not a special form of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after
a period of pervasive human rights abuse” (ICTJ, 2009). Transitional justice will be
understood to include any and all possible methods of post-conflict restorative measures
used to solidify the state of peace, heal societal wounds, and move the country and its
people forward into reconstruction efforts and, eventually, normal life. For the purposes
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of this study, transitional justice will be understood as solely post-conflict justice, and not
any other form of justice emanating from other societal conditions.
Due to the inherently subjective nature of this research, a substantial amount of
interpretation will have to be undertaken in regard to methods that may best work in the
unique Syrian post-conflict process. However, that bias will be mitigated with the
understanding that the goal of the post-conflict process is utilitarian, and aims to move
the whole of society forward, including both victims and perpetrators, in the most
profoundly impactful manner possible. Due to the fact that the researcher spent a little
over two months in the summer of 2015 in Gaziantep, Turkey, working with an entirely
Syrian staff at the Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria (CCSD), it is
pertinent to acknowledge the possibility of bias toward the plight of the Syrian civilian
(non-combatant) population. That bias will be largely inconsequential, however, as the
study is designed to address the post-conflict needs of all Syrians as a whole, regardless
of affiliation or involvement. As the research and analysis are continued, the researcher
will work to ensure reliable and credible sources are utilized, and any obvious biases are
mitigated.
Method
In terms of this study, the population frame will be the whole of Syrian society
impacted by the current conflict. In regard to the research conducted, the entirety of
pertinent international agreements will be considered. The scope of transitional justice
research as a whole will be limited to the instances that lend themselves to situations
similar to that which Syria itself is in.
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Data Collection
Data for this study is qualitative. Data will be collected from the utilization of
Concordia University library and its online databases, as well as scholarly articles and
reports from reputable organizations and experts. Careful consideration will be taken to
ensure all data collected is gathered from sources relevant, knowledgeable, and reliable to
each respective matter.
Analysis
Collected data will be analyzed in a qualitative manner, cross referenced, and
compared with all elements of the study in order to gain a better understanding of the
complete picture. Information on the situation in Syria as well as Syrian perspectives and
considerations will be analyzed, and then compared with the data collected on transitional
justice methods. The study will then attempt to reconcile those perspectives, the unique
problems of the current conflict, and the current state of transitional justice with possible
policy recommendations to fill the most essential gaps.
Ethical Considerations and Safeguards
In order to ensure that this study will not raise any ethical concerns, a full review
was conducted in spring of 2015 by the IRB, and subsequent approval was granted for the
conducting of interviews. All questions and parameters were deemed to pose no
significant ethical concern, and therefore the study was allowed to continue. The only
elements of research that still remain in regard to this study is the further examination of
established policy and current conditions in the Syrian Civil War. My IRB approval was
granted under the understanding that I would undertake the interviews as well as engage
13
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in archival examination of Syria’s conflict and measures of post-conflict justice. Those
interviews have since become irrelevant to the research in this publication and therefore
have been stricken from this thesis so as to ensure that the focus of the research is not
muddled.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
A. Foreign Fighters
Throughout history, many conflicts have had levels of foreign engagement, to
varying degrees. Those foreign elements have been both state-sponsored, as well as
independent, and they have involved monetary influence, intelligence, and/or physical
presence. When transnational fighters have been involved they have done so under a
myriad of motivations, be it monetary, ideological, national interest, or many other
possible factors that drew them in. The foreign fighters in question will be held against a
certain criteria so as to differentiate them from other extranational fighters, such as
mercenaries. For the purposes of this study, an individual known as a contemporary
“foreign fighter” will be understood as they have been defined by Hegghammer (2011),
Malet (2013), and Kraehenmann (2014): as an individual that is engaged in an
insurgency, unaffiliated with an established military organization, within a society other
than that of their citizenship, and receives little to no monetary compensation as their
primary motivation.
That being understood, it is important to examine the history that has led to the
contemporary understanding of foreign fighters. While previous incarnations of
transnational fighters that engaged in conflicts foreign to their own state of citizenship
may not fit the current understanding of a foreign fighter, in regard to the conflict in Syria
their existence, actions, and evolution hold important clues as to the development of a
contemporary foreign fighter and foreign fighter force. With a long and convoluted
history, foreign engagement in conflict produces countless case studies; however, for the
purposes of this section, which serves as a brief examination of the concept and history of
15
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foreign fighters, I will examine the more modern, and pertinent conflicts of the Muslim
world, such as the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan of the 1980s, the Yugoslav Wars of
the 1990s, the conflicts that resulted from the US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan
in the early 2000s, and the contemporary conflicts in Iraq and Syria, among others. But
before this history is examined, the concept of what exactly a foreign fighter is in the
context of contemporary middle-eastern conflict must be unpacked.
There are many variants of foreign fighter. As Hegghammer (2011) noted, they
reside somewhere between local rebels and international terrorists, resulting in a lack of
official nomenclature. Throughout history, conflict participants who were not native to
the country, or the force in which they were fighting have fallen under many categories.
One such instance, historically, has been that of mercenaries. Mockler (1970) and
Burmester (1978) both defined as foreign individuals who engage in combat for monetary
gain, rather than enjoying personal or national stakes in a conflict. Whereas mercenaries
fight for pay with a variety of forces, both state-sponsored and not, the more
contemporary understanding of foreign fighters, as noted by Hegghammer (2011), is that
they can be broken into different categories: state-sponsored or independent, and can
draw fighters from either a regional or global pool. Hegghammer (2011) classifies a
foreign fighter mobilization as state-supported if “a government agency directly supplies
the foreign fighters with material resources” (p. 59), while independent mobilizations
operate with indirect state support, or without any state sponsorship entirely. Motivation
for engaging in warfare also tends to differ between mercenaries and foreign fighters.
The contemporary understanding of foreign fighters shows that they have tended to fight
for little to no pay, but rather under the auspice of a larger shared identity, such as that of
16
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a sociopolitical religious grouping (Hegghammer, 2011; Malet, 2013; Kraehenmann,
2014).
The concept of identity is one that has become central to the modern concept of
the foreign fighter. In referencing the foreign fighter component in the Yugoslav Wars of
the early 1990s, Mustapha (2013) explored the idea of “cosmopolitical citizenship,”
which the author believes the foreign fighters involved in the conflict attained by
abandoning their national identity and adopting the “transnational cause of panIslamism.” This concept of pan-Islamism is linked to the concept of the Muslim umma
which Lund (2013), Mustapha (2013), and Kraehenmann (2014) noted is a global
community of Muslims; many Salafists, especially radicals in groups such as ISIS,
believe the umma is the only “nation” to which they hold allegiance and to which
traditional borders do not apply. The transnational identity bond that pulls foreign
fighters together, specifically Islamist foreign fighters, was examined by Hegghammer
(2011):
“The foreign fighter phenomenon represents a violent offshoot of a qualitatively
new subcurrent of Islamism – populist pan-Islamism – which emerged in the
1970s as a result of strategic action by marginalized elites employed in nonviolent
international Islamic organizations. Seeking political relevance and increased
budgets, these activists – who were mostly based in the Hijaz region of Saudi
Arabia – propagated an alarmist discourse emphasizing external threats to the
Muslim nation. They also established a global network of charities for the
provision of inter-Muslim aid. The norms and networks established by the Hijazi
pan-Islamists then enabled Arab activists in 1980s Afghanistan to recruit foreign
17
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fighters in the name of inter-Muslim solidarity. The ‘Arab Afghan’ mobilization,
in turn, produced a foreign fighter movement that still exists today, as a
phenomenon partly distinct from al-Qaida” (p. 56-57).
This creation, endorsement, and propagation of a shared identity that transcends national
boundaries is a substantial force drawing contemporary Islamist foreign fighters still
today. As Malet (2009) noted, throughout history recruiters of foreign fighters,
regardless of the ethnic and religious background, attempted to frame the conflicts as
battles in defense of a transnational community in which the potential recruit belongs.
The success of the cause of pan-Islamism in recruiting foreign fighters has been evident;
however, there have been many other types of foreign fighter movements.
In the history of foreign fighter mobilizations there have been many different
variations. Some forces have received degrees of state-sponsorship, while some have
operated wholly independently; some forces have been made up of regional volunteers,
and some, as in the case of contemporary Syria and Iraq, have drawn from a more global
pool of fighters. Throughout history variants of transnational fighters have permeated
conflicts around the globe in one form or another. As Malet (2009) found, of the 331
civil conflicts documented in the last 200 years, there is evidence of a foreign fighter
presence in 67 cases, or more than 20 percent of them. Hegghammer (2011) found, in 70
post-1945 conflicts, there were 18 with a private global fighter element (which can be
seen in Figure 1), 16 of which occurred after 1980. That number has no doubt risen with
the use of foreign fighters in contemporary Syria and Iraq. Despite the increased
relevance and focus in recent years, foreign fighters are not a modern phenomenon.
Malet (2009) noted the utilization of foreign combatants during the American
18
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Revolutionary War and the use of mercenaries even before the invention of the nationstate. Williams (2011) found that in the Middle East there is a “long history of borderless
jihadi volunteerism that went all the way back to the ghazis (holy warriors) and
murabitun (wandering fighters) of Medieval Muslim states of North Africa and the
Middle East” (p. 217). Still, the growing prevalence of foreign fighters in conflicts in the
Muslim world displays a clear lineage and an interconnected pattern of recruitment that
appears to be intensifying. The modern foreign fighter movement, present in current-day
Iraq and Syria on a heretofore unprecedented scale (as seen by figure 1), can in part be
traced back to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the 1980s and the mujahidin that
opposed them.
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Figure 1. History of Conflicts Involving a Private Foreign Fighter Component

Note. Retrieved from The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization
of Jihad. Copyright 2011 by International Security. Reprinted with permission.
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Afghanistan in the late 1970s was a country attempting to modernize. The regime
of Mohammed Zahir Shah, and later his brother-in-law Mohammed Daoud, tied the state
to the Soviet Union side of the Cold War’s bipolar system (Malet, 2009). Just as there
were ardent supporters of the pro-Soviet Afghanistan government, so too was there
vehement resistance. The pro-government Marxist supporters regularly clashed with the
resistance, which held its roots as an Islamic fundamentalist response to the Sovietbacked government (Malet, 2009). In 1978 the Daoud government was facing growing
opposition by fundamentalist groups and was consequently overthrown by communist
elements, supported by the Afghanistan military, and subsequently replaced with the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) (Malet, 2009). After the PDPA began
to lose more ground, due largely to its attempts to implement more Soviet-inspired
policies of land reform, women’s rights, and other progressive projects that flew in the
face of the fundamentalist opposition, the USSR decided to launch “Operation Agat,” in
which they began to directly intervene and prop-up a new leader in Babrak Karmal
(Malet, 2009).
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was only expected to last a short time, but
in invading the country, the USSR invigorated the fundamentalist opposition. For one of
the first times, the world began to see the narrative of a transnational Muslim community,
or umma, in calls for foreign fighters (Hegghammer, 2011; Malet, 2009; Williams, 2011).
In his work on the conflict, Malet (2009) noted that the Islamist opposition had a golden
recruiting narrative in defending one of Islam’s holy lands from an incursion by an atheist
Soviet regime, comparing it to the narrative surrounding the Communist threat to
Catholicism used by recruiters of foreign fighters during the Spanish Civil War. While
21
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Osama bin Laden is the most recognizable household name associated with the mujahidin
struggle in Afghanistan, the foreign fighter movement of the 1980s, and its cascading
future engagements, was heavily bolstered by Abdullah Azzam, whom the Brookings
Institution referred to as “The Father of Global Jihad” (Riedel, 2011).
Disappointed by a lack of participation from the larger Muslim community,
Azzam, who was teaching in Islamabad at the time of the Soviet invasion, created an
organization called Makhtab al-Khadamat (MAK) by exploiting his connections in the
wealthy Wahhabi Saudi community. He began to publish recruitment and fundraising
magazines (Malet, 2009). Azzam distributed MAK publications globally, and the
message of recruitment and support was further spread by the organization’s leaders
traveling internationally in order to speak to sympathetic groups around the world
(Hegghammer, 2011; Malet, 2009). In the era of increasing globalization, Azzam and
other recruiters, such as Islamic NGOs, were able to reach larger groups of people faster
and more effectively than ever before, which is why the foreign fighter force in
Afghanistan may have had so much recruiting success when compared to previous
movements (Hegghammer 2011; Karagiannis, 2013; Malet, 2009).
While Hegghammer (2011) would classify the insurgency in Afghanistan as one
that enjoyed tacit, if not explicit state support from the covert operations of Saudi Arabia,
the US, Egypt, and Pakistan, there was also a parallel “grass-roots, mosque-based
movement” led by figures such as Azzam, bin Laden, and other local Muslim leaders
(Williams, 2011). The movement centered on the idea of the umma, and the idea of a
transnational, or ‘cosmopolitical’, identity that called Muslims to fight regardless of their
state of origin (Hegghammer, 2011; Malet, 2009; Mustapha, 2013; Williams, 2011).
22
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Recruiters’ exploitation of this concept of a shared transnational identity was key in
recruiting volunteers to fight in Afghanistan in the 1980s, just as it has been in every
conflict in the Muslim world involving foreign fighters since. The effectiveness of
appealing to a global community of Muslims, and how that community differs from that
of Christianity is articulated well by Karagiannis (2013):
“Unlike Catholicism, the Muslim faith lacks a centralised leadership and a
monolithic doctrine. In fact, Islam resembles Protestantism which is a
polycephalous branch of Christianity made up of many churches and
interpretations. Although politically and economically divided, the Muslim world
still forms a large interconnected religious–cultural system. Therefore, individuals
can claim and beneﬁt from a global identity as members of the ummah (that is the
community of believers) that functions as a complex system of transnational
networks fostering solidarity and cooperation.” (p. 120-121).
This leaderless solidarity allows for vast interpretation and exploitation. Azzam, alQaeda, ISIS, and countless other groups that have called for Muslims to take up arms in
defense of Islam have used the ambiguity and breadth surrounding this community to pull
fighters in from around the world for decades.
This proposition of allegiance to only the cause of the Muslim community served
as an effective tool in Afghanistan, particularly in recruiting regional forces to the fight,
which saw thousands come, due more to the work of local leaders to recruit than due to
that of incentives created by state-sponsors (Lund, 2013; Williams, 2011). While there is
no definitive statistic as to the total number of participants in the Afghanistan insurgency
against the Soviets, most estimates put the number of foreign fighters somewhere
23
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between 5,000-20,000 participants, with some believing that as many as 35,000
volunteers may have cycled through in some capacity by the end of the conflict
(Hegghammer, 2011; Malet, 2009; Williams, 2011). A hallmark of the 1980s
Afghanistan transnational insurgency was the use of regional fighters. Whereas other
conflicts may have included recruits from many places around the world, the mujahidin
foreign fighter force was largely made up of volunteers from the surrounding states, such
as Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other nearby locales, in spite of
some exceptions (Hegghammer, 2011; Malet, 2009; Williams, 2011).
The message had gone out, and foreign volunteers had flooded the insurgent force
with enough bodies to repel the Soviet invasion. But with those volunteers came
unpredictability. In fact, some of the most brutal elements utilized in the current era of
global jihad may have begun with the foreign fighter force in Afghanistan. Through the
course of his interviews with various commanders involved in the conflict, Williams
(2011) found that the “Arab volunteer mujahideen” in the late 1980s were the first to
propose self-martyrdom against the Soviets, through methods such as suicide bombings
(p. 220). The coalescence of the unpredictable and effective mujahidin foreign fighters in
Afghanistan would become a watershed moment for the nature of conflict, especially
within the Muslim world. With all the effort required to pull together such a diverse
transnational force in the name of defending Islam, and the cause of a Muslim state of
Afghanistan, a Soviet withdrawal did not mean dissolution, it was in fact just the
beginning.
The foreign fighter force of “Arab Afghans” had seen success in their bout against
one of world’s two superpowers, so much success, in fact, that they continued on to other
24
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conflicts after their adventure in Afghanistan had concluded. Whereas some of the
mujahidin force joined al-Qaeda or went home, many of the transnational Islamist
fighters went on to other battlefields. A large portion of the fighters moved on to join the
Muslim struggle in Kashmir for independence from India, a Hindu country (Garner,
2013). The Mujahidin entered into the conflict serving as “shock-troops and eventually
fidayeen (suicide) fighter-terrorists” and waging an all-out assault against Indian Security
forces (Garner, 2013; Williams, 2011). This transportation of violence by foreign fighter
populations to other battlefields is a common occurrence, as Malet (2009) found that
veteran foreign fighters often travel to new conflicts and set up an “organizational
infrastructure” in order to wage an effective front. The impact that veteran foreign
fighters have on conflicts extends to the efficiency of the violence. Lister (2015) and
Hegghammer (2013) found that the odds of a successful attack from a terrorist cell
increase when there is even one veteran foreign fighter, calling this the “Veteran Effect.”
The movement of veteran foreign fighters from the Soviet incursion in
Afghanistan to the battlefield of the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s became the next chapter
in the solidification of the Muslim transnational identity. When the six republics of
Yugoslavia began to break apart in 1991, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević presided
over what amounted to a genocide in Bosnia, with Serbian troops targeting civilians as a
means to accelerate an ethnic cleansing of Muslim Bosniaks (Power, 2013). This assault
on the Muslim population, as Power (2013) and Mustapha (2013) noted, which was
largely defenseless, provoked a response from the mujahidin in the form of military
assistance.
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The participation of foreign fighters in Bosnia came shortly after the conflict
began. Malet (2009) estimated approximately 5,000 veterans of Afghanistan’s war
participated in the Bosnian conflict. The composition of the foreign fighter force, as
Mustapha (2013) found, included fighters from places such as Egypt, Syria, Russia, Iraq,
Algeria, and Afghanistan, among other places; this made the conflict much more of a
global transnational insurgency, than the slightly more regional conflict in Afghanistan a
few years prior. Bosnia was not the only side in the conflict to see transnational
volunteers. Arielli (2012) and Malet (2009) noted that Serbian forces gained hundreds of
Greeks, Romanians, Ukrainians, and Russians, and Croatian forces are estimated to have
had over 450 volunteers from as many as 35 different countries participate in different
military formations. The prevalence of foreign fighters in Bosnia was profound.
Hegghammer (2011) and Kraehenmann (2014) noted that the conflict was one of only
five engagements since the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan that has attracted more than
1,000 foreign fighters, with three of the others being post-2001 Afghanistan, post-2003
Iraq, and the ongoing conflict in Syria.
Transnational insurgency in the Yugoslav Wars, specifically in the case of
Bosnia, blossomed as yet another manifestation of Muslims protecting a global identity.
Some foreign fighters in the conflict fell under what Malet (2009) and Hockenos (2003)
found to be a “diaspora transnationalism,” wherein Balkan peoples that had migrated to
the United States and Canada and refrained from participating in their host countries’
communities in favor of being active in their own immigrant communities traveled back
to participate in their home countries’ civil wars; there was also a “non-diaspora
transnationalism” which saw individuals without any ties to the Balkan states join the
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fight because they saw themselves to be a part of a larger community, exterior to the
concept of nationality. This cause of pan-Islamism, and the foreign fighters’ endeavor to
fight for it, as Mustapha (2013) postulated, granted the participants something different
than “state-centered citizenship,” which she refers to as “acts-citizenship”: “citizenship as
acts or as action. In this sense, citizenship can be understood in terms of any ‘political’
activity that creates or commemorates collective identities” (p. 745).
Many of the veterans of the war in Afghanistan were unable to return to their
home countries, as Malet (2009) and Mustapha (2013) noted, which is why they moved
on to the Yugoslav battlefield where they were more welcome. The hospitality was
extended even by the Bosnian government, which absorbed the fighters into the military
in 1992. They created an all mujahidin force in 1993; Sarajevo even went so far as to
grant many of the Muslim foreign fighters Bosnian citizenship and passports. This
legitimization of the foreign fighter element became problematic in the post-9/11 age,
when the mujahidin appeared to be a global threat to security.
Despite their participation in conflicts in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bosnia, the
transnational fighter phenomenon continued to permeate other conflicts throughout the
world. When the Soviet Union broke apart and countries began to assert their status as
independent states, Chechnya came into violent open conflict with Russia and saw the
participation of between 200-300 foreign fighters after the country was inundated with
numerous Islamic NGOs and organizations (Bakke, 2015; Garner, 2013; Hegghammer,
2011). The Chechen conflict held deep meaning for the same mujahidin force that has
dipped its hand in so many other ethnic conflicts around the world; Malet (2009) noted
that Chechnya was a priority for leaders such as bin Laden, and saw Afghanistan veterans
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working as advisors, with many eventually acting as separatist leaders. Despite the
comparatively low number of foreign fighters, the influence of Muslim organizations,
transnationals, and renewed religious expression quickly turned the conflict from one of
nationalist origin into that of a religiously motivated war (Garner, 2013). The allegiance
to the idea of the umma drew fighters to the conflict and continues to do so throughout
others around the world.
The insurgency in Somalia has also drawn comparatively few foreign fighters, but
merits acknowledgement due to the central focus on Islamic identity, nonetheless. The
violent conflict between al-Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government, as well as
Ethiopia, drew between 200-400 fighters according to Hegghammer (2011), with the US
House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security (2011) estimating that 40
American Muslims ventured to Somalia to fight with the insurgency, and Freeman and
Rayment (2012) estimating that as many as 50 British Muslims may have been recruited.
While the conflict has pulled diaspora transnationals back to Somalia, Western
governments have become concerned with the non-diaspora elements that have joined the
insurgency and may return to their home countries with deadly new skills (Karagiannis,
2013; Malet, 2009). The conflict with al-Shabaab has illustrated the increasingly global
reach of the transnational concept of the umma. In the age of globalization reaching
potential recruits has become much easier than it was in the days of Azzam’s jihad in
Afghanistan.
The post-9/11 US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003
respectively, saw some of the largest numbers of foreign combatants since the Soviets’
1980 foray into Afghanistan, with an estimated 1,000-1,500 fighters in Afghanistan and
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4,000-5,000 in Iraq (Hegghammer, 2011). Afghanistan had the added benefit of a preestablished terror network, in the form of al-Qaeda, through which to recruit. This was
led by one of the original mujahidin of the Soviet incursion into the country: Osama bin
Laden. The insurgency in Afghanistan drew most of its Western fighters from Germany,
Britain, and the US, with many of the other fighters coming from other regional Arab
countries. Many more joined when the conflict intensified in 2007 (Hegghammer, 2011;
Karagiannis, 2013). The framework that had been put into place during the mujahidins’
first conflict in the country had leaned itself out to include only the most dedicated
jihadists, as Williams (2011) noted, consolidating the foreign fighter element to become
al-Qaeda. There were notable foreign additions to the insurgency, as Karagiannis (2013)
noted, with people such as American Adam Pearlman joining as a high-profile
spokesperson. The transnational fighter movement was not only bolstered in Afghanistan
due to al-Qaeda, but Iraq as well, which saw an influx of 4,00 to 5,000 foreign fighters
during the US invasion and occupation of the early 2000s (Zelin, 2014).
The US war in Afghanistan in many ways primed the insurgency that was to come
when the country invaded Iraq a mere two years later. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a
Jordanian associate of bin Laden, moved his own insurgent group, which was made up of
Jordanians, Syrians, and some Kurdish Iraqis, to Iraq in 2002, just prior to the 2003 USled invasion; that group would soon become known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Berger &
Stern, 2015; Malet, 2009). While the effectiveness of the foreign fighter element has
been in dispute, the presence was noticeable. Naylor (2009) noted that US officials
estimated that in July of 2007 as many as 60-80 foreign fighters crossed the border into
Iraq each month. Despite these numbers, the transnational fighters still only made up
29

NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE
around 10 percent of the overall insurgent force. They did, however, commit 90 percent
of the deadliest attacks (Malet, 2013B). This deadly propensity could appeal to an
insurgency and frighten a government that might see those fighters return to their home
countries and carry out attacks. Those possibilities were further broadened as the conflict
rolled into a new stage with the rise of ISIS.
The current situation in Iraq and Syria is unprecedented as far as insurgencies go.
The group known as ISIS, among many other names, has taken over large swaths of both
countries, and lays claim to fully operational cells in at least 18 different states worldwide
(Baker 2016). The group that started as AQI morphed into ISIS. Eventually it took
advantage of the destabilized nature of Syria. In the wake of the 2011 rebellion and
ensuing civil war, ISIS was born (Filliu, 2015; Berger & Stern, 2015). ISIS has been able
to compose an incredibly violent and brutal force, with transnational volunteers
representing a substantial portion of their operations, both on the battlefield and in the
media. Some estimates put the number of foreign fighter component in ISIS at over
30,000 participants (Barrett, et al., 2015). In an analysis of the transnational component
from the Brookings Institution, Lister (2015) found that the amount of foreign fighters
that have poured into Iraq and Syria has been unprecedented, with the closest incident
being the mujahidin force in 1980s Afghanistan. As of December 2015, Barrett, et al.
(2015) found that between 25,000 and 31,000 volunteers, from as many as 86 different
countries, have traveled to Iraq and Syria in order to participate in the conflict through
one of the areas insurgent groups. The exact demographics of ISIS are difficult to
determine, given the hostility the group holds towards outside fact-finders and journalists
(Laub, 2016). The countries that have contributed the most foreign fighters to the
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conflict in Iraq and Syria are not relegated to one corner of the globe (as illustrated in
Figure 2), with the most foreign fighters coming from Tunisia, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Jordan, France, and Morocco (Lister, 2015; Barrett, et al., 2015). This is truly a
global conflict on a local stage, representing the largest coalescence yet of violent
transnational fighters from the furthest reaches of the globe, with essentially no oversight,
and tied together primarily by identity.
Figure 2. Foreign Fighter Origins in Iraq and Syria

Note. Retrieved from Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign
Fighters into Syria and Iraq. Copyright 2015 by the Soufan Group. Reprinted with
permission.

Insurgent groups in Iraq and Syria, such as the YPG, Jabhat al-Nusra Front, and
ISIS have all pulled in foreign volunteers, but none have done so to such an efficient
degree as ISIS has. While the call for recruits in 1980s Afghanistan saw men such as
Azzam publishing magazines and scheduling speaking tours around the world in hopes of
attracting volunteers, the age of globalization has reduced all of that to a mouse click.
ISIS recruiters can take their time appealing to potential recruits, convincing them
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through sustained internet contact until they find success (Berger & Stern, 2015; Lister,
2015). Recruitment of foreign fighters throughout history, as Barrett (2014), Berger and
Stern (2015), and Malet (2009) noted, has taken place through social networks, which is
still the same today. Today these are internet social networks, with groups such as ISIS
utilizing Facebook and Twitter to reach out to vulnerable persons in hopes of pulling
them to the cause in Iraq and Syria. While the cause is still loyalty to the umma, groups
such as ISIS are advertising what al-Qaeda and others never did: the caliphate, a true
Islamic State, realized in present day. They are calling on the global Muslim community
to protect it (Berger & Stern, 2015). Despite widespread condemnation from the Muslim
community around the world, ISIS is seeking to place itself as a true interpretation of
Islam. Recruiters reach out to potential volunteers and offer them a solution to what they
believe ails them, luring them to the fight in order to radicalize them once they arrive,
rather than radicalize before they leave home, as has been the tactic of prior Islamist
insurgent groups (Berger & Stern, 2015).
The use of foreign fighters in insurgencies is a tactic that has only become more
accessible in the age of globalization. With the amount of barbarism that can potentially
come from an unaccountable transnational force, it is important to understand that the
trend is on the rise, as Malet (2009) noted:
“An increased number of civil conflicts has raised the overall number of
insurgencies that successfully recruit transnationally, and that process of
globalization makes it easier for recruiters to convince target audiences that they
share common interests with distant populations” (p. 36).
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The globalized world has allowed people to connect to each other in ways that they have
never been able to before and that allows for the creation of an “imagined community”
wherein members feel more connected to people in a far off land, speaking a language
they do not know, and fighting a fight they have never been a part of, than they do to
their own nation (Hegghammer, 2010; Karagiannis, 2013; Malet, 2009). These
transnational volunteers, who are as Arielli (2012), Berger & Stern (2015), and Williams
(2011) noted, typically unmarried men in their 20s and 30s who do not have a career
important enough for them to stay home for, venture to a foreign battlefield and engage in
violent barbarism in the name of a global stateless community. The question, however,
is: What happens next?
Foreign fighters join the fight and engage in a unique portion of the campaign
waged by ISIS. Berger and Stern (2015) found that foreign fighters are heavily featured
in ISIS propaganda, often overrepresented in things such as decapitation videos widely
distributed online. In an interview with Holland (2014), Thomas Hegghammer noted that
foreign participants may help to radicalize the jihad even more. The fighters that come
from afar also tend to engage in brutal acts that native fighters do not, bringing an
increased violence to the group (Berger & Stern, 2015; Holland, 2014). Individuals
willing to leave their home and travel to a foreign land in order to engage in a violent
conflict are committed to the cause, and that commitment to ideology may be what brings
out such barbarism from the foreign fighter population in the ranks of ISIS. Berger &
Stern (2015) noted that many fighters may be motivated by the prospect of adventure.
They may continue to engage other conflicts or return home with a record of violence and
war crimes under their belts.
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The prospect of war criminals returning home to possibly carry out attacks on
their native soil is a dangerous dilemma for a government. Furthermore, if these fighters
scatter back to their homes following the conclusion of their role in the conflict or move
on to another battlefield somewhere else, they may never be held accountable for their
crimes, their victims may never know justice, and the lands in which they operated may
never truly know peace as a result. An important component of the post-conflict process
is seeking justice, and one of the most crucial aspects of obtaining justice for those
impacted by the conflict is addressing the perpetrators of the violence, whether through
prosecutions or amnesty and reintegration programs. The absence of such a large
component of the fighting force in Syria’s post-conflict process could severely infringe
upon processes integral to transitional justice.
Transitional justice is made up of measures to end the cycles of violence, and it
involves a lot of reconciliation between victim and perpetrator. One key process is
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) (ICTJ, 2009). DDR is a process
that requires heavy involvement by national institutions in order to regain a semblance of
control over what happened to the country in question (Nilsson, 2005). Foreign fighters
need to be present in order for that process, and the rest of the transitional justice process
to work correctly. If the post-conflict justice initiatives are hindered by such an absence,
then chaos and violence may soon again return, even after this brutal war has found a
conclusion.
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B. Contemporary Syria
The situation in Syria changes almost every day. Since the outset of the conflict
in 2011 the violence in the country has only become more prevalent and its people more
stratified. Stability in Syria has continued to deteriorate. Many of the UN’s strategic
goals, such as the protection of civilians, are now classified as failures (Bowen et al.,
2015). There have been reports of mass killings, ethnic cleansing, chemical weapons use,
torture, indiscriminate dropping of barrel bombs, and various other breaches of common
wartime practices. After widespread accusations of chemical weapons use, the United
Nations (2013) found in an official investigation “that chemical weapons have been used
in the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against
civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale” (p. 3). Reports of atrocities have
been commonplace in the current conflict since it began. In 2013, Human Rights Watch
(2013) found that pro-government forces entered the town of al-Bayda, moving from
house to house rounding up and executing the town’s men in the street. There are also
widespread accusations of forced conversions. Amnesty International (2014) reported
that, along with their assaults in Iraq, ISIS pushed “dozens of Yezidi border guards and
soldiers” into Syria, where they were forced to convert to Islam (p. 25). The breadth of
abuses purported to have been committed, outlined by Kraehenmann (2014), Human
Rights Watch (2013), and Lister (2016) include summary executions, ethnic cleansing,
slavery, sexual abuse, pillaging, kidnapping, and torture. Heinous practices such as these
amount to only a sampling of the complex situation currently unfolding in Syria.
In the spring of 2011 Syria was swept up in the destabilizing Arab Spring
movement. The outcome of the movement in Syria was more uncertain and extended
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than that of other countries touched by the movement. March of 2011 brought resistance
in the towns of Derra and Damascus. That resistance quickly spread to the rest of the
country following a violent crackdown by government forces, with the first incidents of
armed insurrection occurring in the city of Homs in April of that same year (Berger &
Stern, 2015; Lister, 2016). The crisis in Syria that began as a revolutionary uprising
rapidly became a humanitarian disaster unlike any that the world had seen in some time.
Syria has become a hotbed for human rights violations, with Seils (2013) noting that
there have been ongoing reports of systemic abuses throughout the entirety of the now
approximately six-year war.
The civil war began in 2011 as a grassroots movement demanding political and
socio-economic reforms. After President Bashar al-Assad attempted to suppress the
movement with a violent response, outright war broke out (ARK, 2016). At the time of
the uprising there was already a tense climate in regard to the ruling Assads. After
decades of crackdown by Bashar and his father Hafez, a large portion of the country
turned on their government in response to the violent reaction to protests (Al Jazeera,
2016). While the conflict was originally non-sectarian in nature, eventually sectarian
elements began to arise and factions began to develop (Al Jazeera, 2016). The uprising
was initially divided into pro-government vs. anti-government forces, but as time went
on, five main players began to take shape in the conflict: FSA, Jabhat al-Nusra Front,
YPG, ISIS, and forces loyal to the government of Bashar al-Assad.
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FREE SYRIAN ARMY
Shortly after armed rebellion began to take place, many soldiers in the Syrian
military began to refuse government orders to fire on their own citizens, and defected,
despite the fact that defection meant execution if caught by the regime. In a video
released on June 9th 2011, Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Harmoush and 150 of the soldiers
under his command publicly defected in the village of Bdama in Idlib, creating the Free
Officers Movement (FOM). This event effectively ignited the formation of organized
resistance (Lister, 2016). The FOM would eventually merge with the FSA following the
kidnapping and execution of Harmoush by the Syrian regime; the September merger was
initiated by FSA founder and leader Colonel Riad al-Assad in July of 2011 (Lister, 2016).
Within a year of the uprising, 60,000 soldiers had defected from the pro-regime forces.
Many joined the FSA, as well as several other resistance groups (Lister, 2016; Spyer,
2012).
The Free Syrian resistance movement continued to grow and organize,
establishing a formal relationship with the exiled Syrian National Council (SNC) in
December 2011 (O’Bagy, 2013; Lister, 2016). The fledgling movement required exterior
support, and due to mixed results in Libya, governments in the West were hesitant to
offer broad support. Regional states (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) began to step up
and offer support in place of the West (ARK, 2016; Lister, 2016). Due to the fact that the
FSA was made up of competent defecting officers, the movement began to see military
successes, and quickly became the de-facto force of the revolution (Lister, 2016). With
the formal leadership residing in Turkey, forces on the ground in Syria had difficulty
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communicating with official command, and many factions began acting independently
(ARK, 2016; Lister, 2016).
With a lack of accountability, the FSA began to veer off into questionable tactics.
Accusations of war crimes emerged as early as a year after the organization’s formal
creation (Weaver, 2012). These matters were complicated by the involvement of foreign
actors, namely that of western powers, leaving a sense that the FSA was not being held
accountable for some of the more nefarious acts that it had undertaken (Weaver, 2012).
The FSA ran into further issues as it attempted to become a preeminent force in the war,
as it proved unable to unite the various factions in Syria. This opened the door for Salafi
Islamist fighting groups, and despite maintaining some semblance of partnership with
said groups, the inability of the FSA to operate independently and effectively severely
limited its potential for future success (Berger & Stern, 2015; Lister, 2016). Regime
forces also began to regain territory and authority beginning in 2013 as a result of the
FSA’s failures. Several FSA leaders pointed to the lack of significant assistance from
western governments as a factor that contributed heavily to their inability to grow and
maintain the force and its successes (Lister, 2016). The introduction of ISIS as a force
attempting to usurp all competitors made FSA supremacy and gains an even more distant
dream. The Free Syrian movement began to lose ground on even more fronts (Berger &
Stern, 2016; Lister 2016). In fact, western aid was largely what sustained the FSA.
Islamist and regime forces were wary of any possible “limited strikes” by US forces, the
FSA attempted to take advantage of that fear as much as possible (Cafarella, 2014; Lister,
2016). The regime’s fear of US-led strikes in response to alleged chemical weapons use
by the Assad government ended when a deal was struck that saw the regime’s chemical
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weapons stockpile turned over to avoid confrontation, dashing the revolution’s hopes of a
western intervention against the state’s forces (Lister, 2016; United Nations, 2013).
Russian intervention on behalf of the Assad regime targeted the mainstream
opposition, complicating matters further for the FSA (ARK, 2016; Lister, 2016). Yet, in
2015 the struggle continued, with the FSA making gains with the help of additional
foreign aid, as well as the intermingling of independent Islamist forces (Lister, 2016). By
this point, the “Free Army” banner had become a broad encompassing label that included
many different factions and forces, so long as they adhered to the main components of the
revolution (Lister, 2016). In 2016, as Lister (2016) noted, the tentative relationship
between the FSA and Jabhat al-Nusra Front fell apart, and even more elements of the
conflict began to surface. The current state of the FSA is up for debate. With the US still
offering support to certain “vetted” factions, but Lister (2016) sums the organization’s
present incarnation as follows:
“By late-2016, the FSA had come to represent an expansive, socially and
symbolically powerful but complex umbrella movement, composed of dozens of
semi-autonomous armed opposition groups (AOGs) that are united by the original
moderate ideals of Syria’s revolution. The FSA is a decentralized insurgent
movement that continues to represent the core ideals of Syria’s revolution:
dignity, justice, freedom and liberty” (p. 24-25).
With Syria’s “moderate” force unified in name only, presenting a reasonable, westernbacked alternative to the Assad regime and the violent Islamist groups became extremely
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difficult. The only other alternative seems to be that of the Kurdish YPG, and regional
authorities would rather it fail.
KURDS
Before the onset of hostilities in Syria in 2011, Kurdish Syrians living in the north
of the country along the border with Turkey were largely marginalized by Assad’s
government (ARK, 2016). Ethnic Kurds made up approximately 10% of Syria’s pre-war
population of 23 million, making their marginalization a significant impediment to a just
Syria (BBC, 2011; ICG, 2013). The Kurdish population’s struggle has historically been
about rights and autonomy, and the group saw an opening in the upheaval following the
Arab Spring. The Kurds in Syria, however, are taking advantage of the instability and
unpredictable future of the state, as ICG (2013) reported:
“As occurred in Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003, the current acute crisis presents
Kurds with an opportunity to rectify – or at least start rectifying – what they
consider an historic wrong: the decision by the French and British Mandatory
powers to divide the Near East in a way that left them as the largest non-state
nation in the region” (p. i).
The Kurds saw the crisis in Syria as an opening through which they might be able to
seize their sovereignty. The largest Kurdish political party in the region, the Partiya
Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party, PYD), is an armed group that is the Syrian
Kurdish offshoot of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) which operates in Turkey
(ARK, 2016; Berger & Stern, 2015; ICG, 2013). After the regime forces pulled out of
Kurdish areas in July 2012, the PYD utilized its trained fighting force to expel
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government officials and erect Kurdish flags in place of those of the regime (ICG, 2013).
Despite the pro-Kurdish independence approach, the PYD, and also the grouping of
Kurdish factions known as the Kurdish National Council (KNC), shied away from
espousing an all-out anti-regime stance, and instead chose to propagate a pro-Kurdish
image (ICG, 2013).
The PYD established a militant wing, the People’s Defense Corps (Yekîneyên
Parastina Gel, YPG), which began patrolling Kurdish controlled areas, as well as entering
into confrontations with other groups (ARK, 2016; ICG, 2013). The YPG has had
significant success fighting against groups such as ISIS, taking hold of a number of towns
from the group (Barbarani, 2015). Foreign fighters have served a significant role in the
Kurdish efforts to defeat ISIS and take control of towns under the control of the radical
group. The “Lions of Rojava” is a group made up of volunteer western fighters that fight
alongside the YPG in an attempt to defeat ISIS (Barbarani, 2015). The YPG and its
associated forces have proven to be an effective fighting force against ISIS (BBC
Monitoring, 2016).
Despite the relative strength and success of the YPG, the militia has had
difficulties. Amnesty International (2015) issued reports alleging that “A fact-finding
mission to northern Syria has uncovered a wave of forced displacement and home
demolitions amounting to war crimes carried out by the Autonomous Administration led
by the Syrian Kurdish political party Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) controlling the
area.” Evidence of possible razing of homes was obtained through satellite images
captured by Amnesty International (2015) that showed a distinct reduction in standing
structures. The possibility of war crimes on the part of the Kurdish forces raises
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questions about yet another actor in the Syrian war, which is troubling, concerning the
fact that the other main forces have even more evidence of war crimes against them.
JABHAT AL-NUSRA FRONT
The creation of the Jabhat al-Nusra Front (full name Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl alSham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad, or The Support Front to the People of the
Levant by the Mujahideen of the Levant on the Fields of Jihad) has extensive ties to the
mujahedeen movement that fomented groups such as al-Qaeda (Cafarella, 2014; Lister,
2016b). The group began as an extension of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) which itself
was born out of AQI; ISI leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, sent a Syrian, Abu Mohammed
al-Jolani, and several of his companions into Syria in an attempt to establish a Syrian
wing for ISI (Berger & Stern, 2015; Lister, 2016b). After receiving some support from
ISI, Nusra Front broke with the group in April 2013 and entered into direct confrontation
with ISIS, the renewed and expanded ISI, in 2014 (Lister, 2016b). Nusra Front operated
as a Syrian wing of al-Qaeda central command, which itself came into direct conflict with
ISIS (Chulov, 2016; Lister, 2016b).
Nusra Front quickly established itself as a force in the Syrian conflict, engaging in
a gradualist approach that slowly engaged the population surrounding their sphere of
influence to support the al-Qaeda linked movement (Cassman, 2016; Lister, 2016b). The
insurgent group functioned as an extension of al-Qaeda’s influence, acting as the most
successful incarnation of central command’s plan to establish localized cells from which
to launch coordinated attacks (Cassman, 2016; Lister, 2016b). Despite these factors,
Syria’s opposition has largely tolerated the presence of the group due to Nusra Front’s
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ability to carry out effective attacks on the Assad regime, but in periods of time when
hostilities have been suspended, opposition groups have had a chance to examine
ideological ties and reject the group (Cassman, 2016; Lister, 2016b). The inability of
parties in Syria to maintain a cessation of hostilities has, however, allowed Nusra Front to
maintain its power base and expand its influence (Lister, 2016b). While the organization
is not as well known in the mainstream as groups such as ISIS, they have become a
significant force, recruiting approximately 3,000 Syrians into its ranks in the months
between February and June of 2016 (Lister, 2016b). The threat of US-Russian strikes,
and an increasing scrutiny as to their allegiance to the Syrian cause, pushed the Nusra
Front to reconsider its relationship with al-Qaeda central. Eventually the group opted to
move closer to Syrian opposition groups, rebranding itself ‘Jaish al-Fateh al-Sham,’ also
known as the Front for the Conquest of the Levant (Cassman, 2016; Chulov, 2016; John,
2016; Lister, 2016b). The decision to pivot toward a more independent position, separate
from central al-Qaeda command, is political in nature, seeking to engage Syrian
opposition groups into a more interdependent relationship (Chulov, 2016; Lister, 2016b).
The radicalism displayed by the Nusra Front has raised concerns throughout the
international community, such as the group’s calls for genocidal acts toward Syria’s
minority Alawite population, which represents around 8% to 15% of Syria’s population,
and of which the ruling Assad family is a part (BBC, 2011; Lister, 2016b). Numerous
troubling crimes, outlined by Amnesty International (2016) and Human Rights Watch
(2016), include an increase in abductions by Jabhat al-Nusra Front of journalists,
activists, and lawyers in an attempt to suppress free speech. There were also reports,
documented by Amnesty International (2016), of summary killings in Aleppo and Idlib
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carried out by Nusra Front and affiliated forces on civilians and members of other
fighting groups, sometimes in front of crowds. Amnesty International (2016) also noted
that the first attack that Nusra Front took responsibility for, in 2012, was a suicide
bombing in Damascus that killed 26 people. Nusra Front has consistently utilized tactics
and practices that violate the established rules and norms of conflict, frequently targeting
civilians, and engaging in what may amount to crimes against humanity.
The actions of Jabhat al-Nusra Front become more complicated when the
presence of foreign fighters is considered. A report by Barrett, Berger, Ghosh,
Schoenfeld, el-Shawesh, Skinner, and Soufan (2015) found that in 2015 alone Turkey
arrested 100 people attempting to cross the border into Syria to join Nusra Front. The
fighting force is estimated to have anywhere between 5,000 and 20,000 fighters in total,
as John (2016) noted, and is composed of 70% foreign fighters and only 30% localized
members. Having a high concentration of foreign fighters complicates the alleged
commission of war crimes even further, and draws into question what justice will be
served, and how it will be served. The foreign component and allegations of war crimes
have dogged Nusra Front as well as many other insurgent elements. Yet, the group that
has received the most press is likely that of ISIS.
ISIS
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is a key player in the Syrian civil war that has
drawn upon the instability in Syria and Iraq in order to establish a self-declared Islamic
Caliphate and impose a barbaric and archaic interpretation of Islam. ISIS has its roots in
al-Qaeda, specifically AQI, which was founded and run as a wing of central command in
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October 2004 by Abu Musab al Zarqawi and quickly began a campaign of brutality and
violence, including public beheadings and bombings (Berger & Stern, 2015; Lister,
2014). Following Zarqawi’s death in June of 2006, the organization was rebranded as the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and Abu Omar al Baghdadi was declared the leader (Berger &
Stern, 2015; Lister, 2014). After Abu Omar al Baghdadi was killed in a US-led airstrike
in 2010, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was named the leader of ISI, and he quickly began to
expand the group’s influence in the region (Berger & Stern, 2015; Lister, 2014). ISI
gained ground in the aftermath of the uprising in Syria, with the group rebranding itself
as ISIS once it moved its influence into the country in 2013. The group did this while
moving further away from al-Qaeda central command, which sought Jihad abroad as
opposed to ISIS’s more Syria-focused strategy (Berger & Stern, 2015; Brown, 2015;
Lister, 2014). Ayman al Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda Central, publicly severed ties with
ISIS in 2014 as Baghdadi’s group gained strength and territory, and came into conflict
with Nusra Front, as well as other rebel groups (Berger & Stern, 2015; Lister, 2016c).
Since its inception, ISIS has been a menacing presence in the region, enacting a campaign
of barbarism and cruelty; the group’s actions have made it a consistent violator of human
rights.
ISIS has spent its tenure in Syria and Iraq attempting to establish an “Islamic
Caliphate,” which is a sovereign state led by the self-declared caliph, Baghdadi, and in
doing so has caused a substantial amount of bloodshed. In territories under ISIS control,
a strict fundamentalist approach to Islam is practiced, with violent punishments for those
who disobey. A report by the United Nations Human Rights Council (2014) noted that
ISIS utilizes harsh punishments for those residing in territory under its control if they do
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not follow the rules of the group. The report, as well as Berger & Stern (2015), argued
that those found to be in violation of ISIS’s strict interpretation of Shariah law, were
punished with lashings, amputations, torture, death, and a myriad of other penalties that
fly in the face of human rights. The group’s rigid interpretation of Islam has led to
allegations of horrendous crimes, such as one instance, reported by Dearden (2015),
when two children under the age of 18 were allegedly crucified for violating their fast
during Ramadan. Their bodies were then displayed in public. This is not the only
instance of barbarism toward children by ISIS. There are reports of ISIS crucifying
children, burying them alive, using mentally handicapped children as suicide bombers,
and even selling young children into sex-slavery (Buncombe, 2015). These acts of
brutality toward those living in territory that the group controls are coupled with its
horrifying tactics of warfare, especially toward those whom it captures.
Allegations of the forced conversions of Yazidi border guards, as well as attempts
to commit acts of genocide upon the Yazidi people, are some of ISIS’s most notable
offenses, but they have also undertaken other unique acts of brutality (Amnesty
International, 2014). ISIS has engaged in a concerted effort to broadcast its barbarism to
the world by beheading journalists, aid-workers, and soldiers, burning people alive,
drowning captives in cages, as well as many other violent executions, and then
disseminating the footage online for the world to see (Amnesty International, 2014;
Berger & Stern, 2015; Brown, 2015; Wheeler, 2016). These acts fly in the face of the
established rules of engagement for warfare and pose a number of post-conflict justice
questions. The substantial presence of foreign fighters in the group complicates things
even further, given that a large portion of the estimated 30,000 extra-national fighters
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have ventured to Syria following the recruiting call of ISIS (Barret et al., 2016). The
allegations of widespread war crimes, likely by, in part, some foreign nationals, mires an
already complicated situation even further. ISIS and other insurgent groups, however, are
not the only ones that have engaged in these acts, many reports suggest the regime of
Bashar al-Assad has violated the norms of warfare on several occasions.
ASSAD
Bashar al-Assad succeeded the rule of his father, General Hafez al-Assad, in
2000, after he had run the country as a military dictatorship since 1970 (Berger & Stern,
2015). The repressive tactics of the Assad regime pushed a large portion of the Syrian
people into protest following the eruption of the Arab Spring movement. The movement,
however, quickly evolved into outright resistance, upon which the regime brutally
cracked down. Following the torture of some teenage boys in Daraa in response to antigovernment graffiti, protesters took to the streets. They were then fired upon by regime
forces in what became known as “Great Friday”, which resulted in the death of 100
protesters (Berger & Stern, 2015; Lister, 2016). The violence quickly escalated
throughout the country, and by May of 2011, only a few months after the initial protests,
over a thousand people had been killed (Berger & Stern, 2015). Resistance rapidly
evolved into all-out warfare, with exceedingly brutal tactics, causing many in the
regime’s security forces to defect to opposition factions.
The Assad regime has been accused of violating the norms of warfare and
engaging in crimes against humanity. In one instance, an egregious offense occurred
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when government and opposition forces met in the town of al-Bayda; Human Rights
Watch (2013) summarized the incident as follows:
“Around 1 p.m., the local opposition fighters retreated and government and progovernment forces entered the village and proceeded to search the houses. Over
the next three hours, a familiar pattern repeated itself in most parts of al-Bayda:
government and pro-government forces entered homes, separated men from
women, rounded up the men of each neighborhood in one spot, and executed
them by shooting them at close range” (p. 1).
Summary executions of civilians is an egregious offense, and the international
community was quick to rebuke the regime forces’ actions. Government forces,
however, continued a campaign of barbarism against the Syrian people. The Assad
regime has frequently targeted opposition and often civilians in systemic campaigns of
violence that amount to war crimes. Amnesty International (2017) reported that in the
five years between 2011 and 2015 up to 13,000 people were hanged in secret at a prison
in Saydnaya. Many of the people killed at the prison were civilians. One of the most
damming allegations came with backing of the CIA, which purported that the regime
utilized chemical weapons on opposition groups, civilians, and even children (Lister,
2016; United Nations, 2013). The use of chemical weapons is largely viewed by the
international community to be a “red-line” for intervention against the regime. Political
maneuvers between Assad and Russia regarding a relinquishment of the country’s
chemical weapons stores were sufficient to avoid that scenario (Browne & Labott, 2016;
Kessler, 2013; Lister, 2016).
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The relationship between the Assad regime and Russia has complicated matters
even further, with Putin’s government backing a head of state that has allegedly
committed egregious offenses on numerous occasions, some with Russian support
(Lister, 2016). The tactics employed by Syrian and Russian forces have drawn
widespread condemnation. Among other things, Amnesty International (2016b)
documented that the two governments engaged in systematic targeting of hospitals in
opposition areas, in a flagrant violation of the established norms and international law.
Russian actions in aid of Assad have frequently come under fire as war crimes, as Lister
(2016) noted:
“Russian aircraft were blamed for an intentional two-hour attack on a UNmandated humanitarian aid convoy and over 500 people were killed in two weeks
of bombing that followed. Bunker buster bombs were used for the first time,
including on hospitals constructed underground” (p. 23).
Assaults on aid workers as well as places such as schools and hospitals are flagrant
violations of accepted humanitarian law. This has mired not only Syrian forces, but the
Russian and Iranian governments, which have aided Assad, in international
condemnation.
The Assad regime has come under constant scrutiny from the international
community for its role in war crimes perpetrated on opposition forces as well as civilians
and even children. Syria’s war has become a six-year lesson in cruelty, leaving millions
displaced and hundreds of thousands dead. The conflict will leave an entire generation
lost, with no clear picture as to what a future Syria looks like, if a future Syria even
49

NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE
exists. The number of people who have been displaced over the course of the war is
staggering: a total of 11 million Syrians displaced, 6.3 million as IDPs, more than 4.8
million registered as refugees, and half of those refugees are children (Amnesty
International, 2016c; Mercy Corps, 2016; UNHCR, 2017). Such a mass exodus alone
would make the situation a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions, but the chaos does not
end with displacement. Over 13.5 million people in Syria are still in need of
humanitarian assistance, between 450,000 and 470,000 people have died, including
50,000 children killed, and life expectancy in the country has dropped to 55.4 years in
2015 from 77.5 in 2010 (Boghani, 2016; I Am Syria, 2016). The crisis in Syria has seen
the country in constant turmoil, torn apart by numerous violent actors, with civilians
caught in-between. There will have to be extensive restorative measures in order to help
the people of Syria move forward once this violence has ended.
Despite numerous substantiated reports regarding the violence, death tolls, and
atrocities in Syria, the true extent of the situation is hard to determine in its current stage.
The difficulty of documenting, verifying, and subsequently stopping these alleged crimes
against humanity is immense due to the volatile nature of the Syrian conflict. Violent
actors have been actively ripping apart any semblance of a state over the course of the
last six years, and therefore it is going to take a concerted effort and a substantial amount
of time to determine the true extent of the crisis that has unfolded for the Syrian people.
As the violence reigns, and long after the dust settles, the need for transitional justice will
be considerable. Sorting through the violations committed by each actor, holding foreign
participants accountable, and assembling a governing body to manage transitional justice
measures will involve a Herculean effort. The effort, however, is one of absolute
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necessity if the Syrian people are to have any hope of moving forward after this brutal
and horrific chapter in their history.

C. Transitional Justice
Transitional justice is a complex and ever-changing instrument of post-conflict
reconstruction and reconciliation. As time has passed, the concept has evolved from that
of solely an internal matter for the country involved to an internationally monitored
necessity involving everything from trials to reparations and memorials. The institution
of transitional justice is a multifaceted undertaking with the purpose of doling out justice
where it is due, stopping victor’s justice, preempting cycles of violence, reinstating order,
and assisting in the reconciliation of victims and perpetrators so that society can move
forward together and rebuild. Countries have implemented transitional justice measures
for centuries, but the process has only become an accepted international imperative since
the aftermath of WWII and the atrocities committed in Germany. Since the Nuremberg
Trials, this process has evolved considerably. It experiences new interpretations and
additions every time it is utilized, such as in the case of Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Colombia,
South Africa, and many other countries. ICTJ (2017) has defined transitional justice as
follows:
“Transitional justice refers to the ways countries emerging from periods of
conflict and repression address large scale or systematic human rights violations
so numerous and so serious that the normal justice system will not be able to
provide an adequate response.”
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The importance of implementing transitional justice measures is difficult to quantify,
however there is a line of reasoning behind its usefulness. The peace process is just the
first step in resolving the conflict as ICTJ (2012) noted,
“Because systemic human rights violations affect not just the direct victims, but
society as a whole, in addition to satisfying these obligations, states have duties to
guarantee that the violations will not recur, and therefore, a special duty to reform
institutions that were either involved in or incapable of preventing the abuses.

A history of unaddressed massive abuses is likely to be socially divisive, to
generate mistrust between groups and in the institutions of the State, and to
hamper or slow down the achievement of security and development goals. It
raises questions about the commitment to the rule of law and, ultimately, can lead
to cyclical recurrence of violence in various forms.”

Transitional justice is a means of bringing a society together so that it may move forward
with more traditional reconstruction efforts, and attempt to rebuild after conflict or a
period of transition.

Transitional justice has come into much more of a mainstream practice since the
end of WWII; evolving and gaining traction in areas other than simply judicial
proceedings. The scars that war inflicts upon society are ever-growing. Borer (2009)
noted that during WWI 80% of casualties were soldiers, but by the 1990s up to 90% of
those killed in war were civilians. The fact that war touches broad swaths of society in so
many ways means that many different elements must be employed in order to heal the
wounds created. While not limited to the elements in this section, the discipline has
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developed into a set of elements, each meant to serve a different purpose. Some
applications of the process are not possible due to the outcomes of the conflict period
and/or transition, which van Zyl (2009) noted was the case for post-war Germany, when
the Nazis were defeated outright. In contrast, Chile’s transition allowed Pinochet to
retain considerable authority over the military, making trials difficult to impossible.
Despite the fact that they are not always possible, the most high-profile and oldest
practiced of the toolset is that of criminal prosecutions, which have become a standard
international staple following any ugly conflict since the trials following the fall of the
Axis powers in the 1940s.

CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The implementation of criminal prosecutions is the most traditional and practical
of post-conflict reconciliation efforts. ICTJ (2009) defined the criminal prosecution
effort as such, “These are judicial investigations of those responsible for human rights
violations. Prosecutors frequently emphasize investigations of the “big ﬁsh”: suspects
considered most responsible for massive or systematic crimes” (p. 1). In fact,
prosecutions were the first international display of the transitional justice process. As
Scarlet (2009) noted, the post-conflict trials in Nuremburg that held high-ranking Nazi
officials accountable for atrocities committed during the war is where the field finds its
roots; before this “perpetrators of human rights violations committed during wartime
were often granted amnesty as part of peace negotiations” (p. 170). Cole (2007) pointed
out that the very concept of “crimes against humanity” was born out of the terrible acts
committed during WWII and were created during the Nuremburg trials.
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In the decades that followed those post-WWII prosecutions, transitional justice
has been developed further. Since the 1980s there has been a dramatic uptick in calls for
post-conflict trials for human rights abuses, in what Lutz and Sikkink (2001) and Sikkink
(2011) have deemed “the justice cascade” (Kim and Sikkink 2012). This “cascade” of
human rights prosecutions has had a positive impact, as Kim and Sikkink (2012) found
through their study of transitional countries between 1980 and 2004, which showed that
those with human rights prosecutions were less repressive than those without, and those
with more cumulative prosecutorial processes were less repressive than those with less.
The move toward holding perpetrators accountable for crimes against humanity was
institutionalized as well, as noted by Huyse and Salter (2008)
“A major policy shift, both morally and politically grounded, occurred from the
mid-1980s onwards. The global growth of a human rights culture blossomed into
a new, now much wider, fight against impunity. International agencies such as the
United Nations (UN) and the Inter-American Human Rights Court as well as large
human rights NGOs cooperated to develop both the norm and the practice of a
duty to prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. This in turn
resulted in the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals of The Hague (for the former
Yugoslavia) and Arusha (for Rwanda) and of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), and in the gradual spread of the principle of universal jurisdiction” (p. 2).
As accountability mechanisms grew, results began to solidify. The benefits of exercising
human rights trials, while not conclusive, trend toward positive outcomes. Sikkink and
Walling (2007) found that South America, a region that has had more of these trials than
any other, has also seen profound transition to democracy, with waves of change since
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the 1980s when Lutz and Sikkink’s (2001) “justice cascade” began. Whether the trials
are effective due to the threat of deterrence or the establishment of norms is still up for
debate.
Some regions are historically more averse to domestic trials for human rights
offenders than are others, and some vary in type of trial: domestic, foreign, or
international. What differentiates domestic trials from foreign trials is location and
operation, domestic trials occur in the judicial system of the country in question, whereas
foreign trials occur in the judicial system of a country other than where the transition is
taking place. International trials occur in much more of a hybrid system (Sikkink and
Walling, 2007). Sikkink and Walling (2007) found that, in countries undergoing
transition from an undemocratic regime to a more democratic one where human rights
abuses had been committed, when the number of years wherein domestic trials were
conducted were measured, the Americas had the highest instance with 54%, whereas the
Middle East and North Africa were at the lowest with 0% (p.6). That low percentage of
proceedings has dangerous implications when it comes to addressing post-conflict justice
in current-day Syria, as the region has not had widespread success utilizing the founding
element of transitional justice. That historical deficit is not the end of the road, however,
as many countries opt for other elements of the post-conflict process in order to tailor it to
their situation.
Criminal prosecutions are not always the most satisfactory of the transitional
justice process. This is because most societies that are just coming out of conflict or a
period of transition are not capable of punishing large swaths of offenders in their court
systems. Due to the fact that Pinochet and his allies still commanded considerable power
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in Chile when the country transitioned toward democracy prosecution of many human
rights abusers was not possible, as van Zyl (1999) noted. Rwanda, for example, has had a
difficult time processing the more than 100,000 Rwandans that took part in the country’s
genocide, requiring the utilization of more community based efforts, which will be
examined later on as extensions of traditional transitional justice (Scarlet, 2009). South
Africa also underwent a complex transitional endeavor following the Apartheid era. Due
to an inability to effectively prosecute all offenders, the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was created in order to grant forgiveness in order to
gain a fuller picture of the period in question (Huyse and Salter, 2008). Once a
community asses the grand nature of a prosecutorial endeavor following a period of
transition the reality that not everyone accountable can be punished becomes a heavy
weight to bare. Rwanda ran into this problem following the 1994 genocide that left
800,000 people dead when neighbors were encouraged to kill neighbors (Westberg, 2010;
Gourevitch and Stewart, 2015). Approximately 120,000 suspects were imprisoned by the
government following the genocide, a number far too high for the country’s court to
handle, so Rwandans went a different way (Westberg, 2010). Gacaca Courts were
established as a community measure that allowed neighbors to come together and address
the levels together, bringing victims and perpetrators together (Westberg, 2010; Brehm,
Uggen, and Gasanabo, 2014). The success of small-scale individualized approaches to
transitional justice such as the Gacaca Courts is testimony to the interpretive nature of
each transitional justice process. The one commonality between all post-conflict
societies, however, is the need to find the truth.
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TRUTH COMMISSIONS
Truth commissions are utilized in an effort to uncover what actually happened
during the period of conflict so that victims may be vindicated, and wounds can begin to
heal. ICTJ (2009) noted the purpose of these truth commissions, “These commissions of
inquiry have the primary purposes of investigating and reporting on key periods of recent
abuse. They are often ofﬁcial state bodies that make recommendations to remedy such
abuse and to prevent its recurrence” (p. 1). Further delineating the purpose of truth
commissions, Cárdenas, Páez, Rimé, and Arnoso (2015) wrote that the process serves:
“(i) To attempt to discover the truth about the period of collective violence; (ii) to
recognize and validate victims' suffering; (iii) to provide compensation for those
affected, both materially and symbolically; (iv) to contribute to the creation of an
inclusive collective memory oriented toward the future; (v) to prevent new acts of
violence; and (vi) to seek justice.”
The desired outcome of truth commissions is directly aligned with that of criminal
prosecutions, with the hindrance of punishment replaced with amnesty in an effort to
make discovering the truth more plausible.
South Africa is one of the better known examples of this facet of the transitional
justice process. Due to the country’s unique transition and an inability on the part of the
courts to prosecute offenders, as van Zyl (1999) noted, the process of truth commissions
had to be used, instituting the controversial practice of amnesty. The purpose of the truth
commissions, as described by Borer (2009) and van Zyl (1999), was to get to the truth of
what happened in order to grant amnesties and establish who deserved reparations. The
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amnesty was outlined in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995
which explained that the commission should work toward the purpose of “facilitating the
granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating
to acts associated with a political objective and comply with the requirements of this Act”
(ch. 2, sec. 3[1][b]). The Act, as noted by Borer (2009), also determined which victims
had suffered gross violations of human rights (GVHR), determined by those that had
experienced, or in certain circumstances had relatives experience “harm in the form of
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a substantial impairment
of human rights” (ch. 1, sec. 1[xix]). The commission undertook a massive endeavor,
taking statements from 21,000 potential victims regarding 37,672 potential human rights
violations (Borer, 2009; Cole, 2007). Amnesty was denied in 5,392 cases out of a total
7,112, yet there were not many significant prosecutions to follow, instead the stated opted
for a formal apology, and the TRC made several recommendations, including issuing
reparations, prosecuting those that were denied or did not seek amnesty, and the
institution of reforms (USIP, 1995).
The question then becomes, for cases such as that of South Africa and others like
it, what is to be done with those that are not prosecuted and incarcerated? How is society
supposed to bring actors in conflict back into the fold once it has ended? Reintegration is
a complex endeavor, but one that is necessary if a society is to truly move on without
cycles of violence, and stop “victor’s justice” then it must address how former
combatants are to coexist in the same society as their victims.

58

NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE
REINTEGRATION EFFORTS
Reintegrating former combatants after a period of conflict and/or transition is a
difficult yet necessary endeavor. The act of reintegration is also an act of disarmament,
which is an endeavor of the peace process, Nilsson (2005) and Clark (2014) noted that
disarmament and reintegration ensures assimilation back into society. This prevents a
return to violence. The act of reintegration is so integral to the post-conflict process, and
the process of peace and disarmament itself, that the United Nations has even published
The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)
which link heavily to the cause of transitional justice (Clark, 2014; UNICEF, 2006). The
efforts to reintegrate combatants have become a priority due to the fact that trust and
security cannot be gained while there is still a large group of armed belligerents left-over
from conflict (Nilsson, 2005). As conflicts end reintegration becomes a difficult task to
accomplish, there is the threat of former combatants engaging in crime, the need for
special assistance for certain sub-groups of fighters, and the fact that people that were
once soldiers suddenly need new jobs, and if those jobs are even possible to create, they
still have to work alongside people that they may have harmed, or may know someone
that they have harmed (Nilsson, 2005). This fact is why the process of reintegration is
often undertaken as an element of a broader transitional justice process and not the sole
endeavor itself; there is healing, truth-seeking, and justice required in order for a society
to accept the reintroduction of former combatants into the fold.
According to the UN (1999), in order for combatants to be reintegrated they need
to be ex-combatants, which means they need to be disarmed. However, there is some
difficulty, as Nilsson (2005) noted, due to the fact that despite a clear definition of what a
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combatant is in interstate war, with the presence of guerilla forces and other groups with
a lack of clear organization, there is no clear delineation for those in intrastate war. This
murky classification makes the process of reintegration difficult, but it is not a problem
that is going away. In a study observing the types of armed conflict from 1946-2008,
PRIO (2009) found that intrastate conflict was far more predominant than that of
interstate conflict, as can be seen in figure 1. The prevalence of intrastate conflict in the
modern world presents a conundrum for post-conflict justice in places such as Syria,
which has multiple non-state forces involved in the conflict, as well as Colombia, which
is in the midst of a peace process between the state and the leftist guerilla group Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).
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Note. Retrieved from PRIO: Armed Conflicts Version 4-2009. Copyright 2009 by PRIO.
Reprinted with permission.
The conflict between the Colombian government and the FARC dates back to
1964, but it has roots as far back as the 1940s, operating as an armed peasant resistance
group (Vargas, 1999). With such an entrenched and historical conflict, the peace process,
and by extension the transitional justice process is a complex endeavor to undertake, but
the two sides have been working to come to an agreement. Reintegration is of paramount
concern, as the FARC is estimated to have between 8,000 and 10,000 active combatants,
according to Howe and Nussio (2012), which means the government cannot simply lock
every offender up. They must find a way to reconcile the fighting forces with the
civilians that have experienced the ravages of such a long and protracted conflict. The
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damage done by the conflict in Colombia has created a tense atmosphere that is not
conducive to a process such as reintegration, as International Crisis Group (ICG) (2013b)
concluded, “over five decades, the conflict has claimed the lives of an estimated 220,000,
displaced over five million and made refugees of nearly 400,000” (p. ii). The reluctance
to accept peace and reintegration measures was illustrated in 2016 when the Colombian
people rejected a referendum that would result in peace between the government and the
FARC forces; as of this writing a new deal that would require more openness by the
FARC about illicit activities committed has been approved by the Colombian government
(Onyanga-Omara and Gomez, 2016). Part of that reconciliation and reintegration process
involves airing the truth about what has happened. One of the conditions, outlined in a
NOREF report by Pfeiffer (2015) is “committing to telling the truth about their
paramilitary past by signing a truth agreement with the government” (p. 2). Truth telling,
as has already been established, is an essential part of the transitional justice process, so
much so that it is often tied in with reduced sentencing. The NOREF report also cites
other amnesty conditions that must be met by FARC members, such as “satisfactory
participation in the government’s reintegration programme; not being involved in other
crimes post-demobilisation; and undertaking 80 hours of community service” (p. 2).
DDR is an integral part of the post-conflict process, and many times, such as the case for
Colombia, it is also a part of the peace process.
REPARATIONS PROGRAMS AND MEMORIALIZATION EFFORTS
Initiating reparations programs is an important step toward repairing the damage
that has been done to the victims of a conflict. ICTJ (2009) explained that reparations
programs are “state-sponsored initiatives that help repair the material and moral damages
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of past abuse. They typically distribute a mix of material and symbolic beneﬁts to
victims, beneﬁts that may include ﬁnancial compensation and ofﬁcial apologies.”
Reparations programs have been undertaken by many post-conflict and transitional
societies, Huyse and Salter (2008) and ICTJ (2016) pointed to Sierra Leone after its
period of unrest ended in 1999, which anointed the National Commission for Social
Action (NaCSA) the agency in charge of implementing reparations programs, it has
received government grants as well as aid from the international community, but it has
still suffered from a lack of funds in attempting to compensate victims. Sierra Leone has
engaged in reparations programs, such as the President’s formal apology to the women
impacted by the violence as a symbolic compensation, but those programs, as ICTJ
(2016) pointed out, were only a portion of the country’s transitional justice endeavor.
The process of repaying victims for the pain and suffering they endured was tied to truth
commissions and eventual prosecutions. While there was a large degree of amnesty
granted through the truth commissions, the establishment of The Special Court for Sierra
Leone in 2002 began a process which, as of 2011, had resulted in eight convictions.
Several countries have initiated reparations plans. Following a recommendation by the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Peru began to institute a reparations program for
victims in 2005, and Timor-Leste has approved recovery and reparations programs,
although little progress has been made. It is important to link reparations with
prosecutions and/or truth-commissions, as ICTJ (2009) and Duthie and Greiff, (2009)
noted, in order to remove the appearance of paying off victims.
Reparations often come in the form of material gestures, as well as symbolic ones.
Following the violent reign of the Pinochet regime in Chile, the government awarded
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victims $1.6 billion to victims, created a special healthcare program for survivors, and
issued an official apology (ICTJ, 2016). Formal apologies, while not a substantial way to
replace what has been lost, can be an integral part of the reparations process. The
purpose of an apology, as Verdeja (2010) wrote, is to bring attention to the suffering and
abuse that may have occurred during a time of upheaval, an acknowledgement of regret
over wrongdoing, a solidification of acceptance of accountability, but it is not sufficient
reparation on its own, there must be some combination with compensation.
Reparations are a touchy subject, but often times a necessary undertaking in order
for people to feel that they have gained back some semblance of what they have lost. The
process of reparation is accurately summed up by a report from the United Nations Office
of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) (2008):
“It is generally understood that the right to reparation has a dual dimension under
international law: (a) a substantive dimension to be translated into the duty to
provide redress for harm suffered in the form of restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction and, as the case may be, guarantees of non-repetition;
and (b) a procedural dimension as instrumental in securing this substantive
redress” (p. 6).
There is a clear importance in allowing victims to experience some form of redress.
Without a substantial and acceptable amount of compensation for their pain and suffering
no amount of truth-telling or criminal proceedings will help those affected move past
what they experienced.
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Reparations programs in transitional justice processes can be difficult to give
shape to, as the process itself is inherently subjective. The OHCHR report on the
measures required goes on to delineate criteria required for ensuring “completeness” of
the programs. The requirements include basing the program around information about
the victims, making the program participatory in nature, including a large amount of
outreach as a central tenet of the proceedings, making the process as accessible as
possible, and requiring evidentiary thresholds (p. 16-18). All these components are
central to a successful reparations program within a post-conflict justice system.
However, compensating victims is not only accomplished through reparations, but also
through the institution of memorials and tributes, ensuring that society never forgets that
chapter in history.
Monuments and memorials are a service to memory, they serve a purpose, but
they can often serve a variety of them. The impact of monuments is described by Mégret
(2010); “At times, monuments are specifically built for commemorative purposes, at
times, certain monuments are destroyed in particular symbolic ways and yet, at other
times, monuments that were symbolic of the criminal regime are kept, although at
counter-purpose” (p. 26). Symbols operate in a powerful way, serving as a reminder in
many forms. Memorials occur in many societies post-conflict in order to collectively
remember. In South Korea many communities held memorials following the Korean
War and the post-conflict truth commissions, and the same can be said for many other
societies following the closure of conflict (Hayner, 2010). Memorials also often occur in
a lasting physical form, for example, monuments to the Holocaust in Nazi Germany exist
all around the world as a means of collective remembrance. There are many different
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expressions of memorialization, as Barsalou and Baxter (2007) pointed to, it can be a
constructed site, such as monuments, museums, commemorative libraries, victims’ names
on walls, or internet memorials; a found site, such as graves, mass killing or genocide
locations, or the sites of former concentration camps or torture centers; and activities,
which can include anniversaries of events related to the conflict, temporary exhibits,
renamed/rededicated locations, tours or parades, demonstrations and events, and
apologies. The sheer variety of memorialization leaves it up to each community to
decide what the legacy of their transition will be. In his examination of the transitional
justice process of Bosnia and Herzegovina Garbett (2012) discussed the need for the
citizens of the country to continue the restorative process long after the final mastermind
has been tried, calling it a responsibility to take “national ownership” of the process,
make it one’s own, and never forget it. The idea of collective memory can, in itself be a
form of memorialization. Following on the difficult nature of reparations programs and
instituting memorialization efforts, one of the most challenging, yet most important
aspects of the transitional justice process is ensuring gender justice.

66

NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE

Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, Germany

GENDER JUSTICE
Violence against women during conflict is a pervasive issue. Borer (2009)
concluded that rape is used as a tool of war to emasculate the enemy’s men, but it is also
perpetrated by soldiers and peacekeepers meant to protect those same women. Often
women join the struggle militarily as well. Gender-based justice is not necessarily a
separate undertaking so much as it is a component of all other elements of transitional
justice, one that demands specific focus. ICTJ (2016) noted that engaging in transitional
justice gives a society, and gender activists, an opportunity to correct social inequities
through reforms, alongside the reparations made to women for violence committed
against them, which should be uncovered through truth commissions and prosecuted
through criminal proceedings. Gender justice is accomplished most effectively through
reforms, which is itself a pillar of the transitional justice process.

67

NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Initiating institutional reforms after a period of conflict is the means by which a
society course corrects for its future, ensuring that the faulty systems that led to violence
in the first place are dismantled. ICTJ (2016) defined the various methods of institutional
reform:
“Vetting: examining personnel backgrounds during restructuring or recruitment
to eliminate from public service or otherwise sanction abusive and corrupt
officials.
Structural reform: restructuring institutions to promote integrity and legitimacy,
by providing accountability, building independence, ensuring representation, and
increasing responsiveness.
Oversight: creating publicly visible oversight bodies within state institutions to
ensure accountability to civilian governance.
Transforming legal frameworks: reforming or creating new legal frameworks,
such as adopting constitutional amendments or international human rights treaties
to ensure protection and promotion of human rights.
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration: disbanding armed actors—
such as paramilitary groups—and providing justice-sensitive processes and means
by which ex-combatants can rejoin civil society.
Education: training programs for public officials and employees on applicable
human rights and international humanitarian law standards.”
Instituting reforms in manners such as these is a critical way to rebuild a more secure and
equitable society post-conflict. It is important not to overdo these institutional reforms
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and destabilize the government entirely, as was the case in post-conflict Iraq following
the US-led invasion of 2003. As Berger and Stein (2014) and Zeren (2014) explained, In
an attempt to rid the government of corruption and initiate massive reform, the US force
decided to disband the Iraqi military and purge the government of all Ba’ath Party
(Saddam Hussein’s ruling party) members. That act of de-Ba’athification resulted in
more than 100,000 Sunni Ba’athists “unemployed, angry, and for the military personnel,
armed” (p. 19). Many of those purged Sunni’s went on to become integral to the
foundation of ISIS, while at the same time the government of Iraq had lost many of its
experienced officials. This was an attempt at broad reform that went too far.
Despite the disastrous reform failure in Iraq, institutional reforms have been
implemented successfully in numerous post-conflict transitions. The importance of
reform implementation was summed up by Oette (2016) that the act of reform
“May be among the terms of peace agreements, and constitutes a prerequisite for
accountability and reparation measures. It also plays an important role in
providing a framework that guarantees civil, political, social, economic and
cultural rights of individuals and communities, and embodies fundamental values
of governance” (p. 11).
Reforms set the stage for many other facets of transitional justice, and they continue on to
become a foundation for a new society. In order to prevent a reoccurrence of violence
past, the systemic roots that allowed the violence to begin with must be addressed
(Duthie & Greiff, 2009). As Cady (2003) and Oette (2016) noted, the UN has stepped in
many times to help administer law reforms in cases such as East Timor and Kosovo.
South Africa is another society which engaged in massive reforms after the end of the
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Apartheid-era. There were systematic reforms, with some of the most notable coming in
the education sector. In the aftermath of Apartheid, as Fiske and Ladd (2004) noted, the
education system had to deal with a system that granted many more resources to white
schools than to the schools of Africans. Reforms were instituted to make the education
more equitable and less race-based, and more democratic controls were put in place on a
governmental level, attempting to overcome the country’s legacy of division (Arthur,
2009; Fiske & Ladd, 2004). The institution of reforms are designed to correct past
inequities, prepare the country for the future, and ensure that other transitional justice
measures are able operate to maximum effect.
Transitional justice is a complex and ever-evolving endeavor. Each conflict
requires a unique approach to post-conflict justice, and Syria will not be an exception.
The country has been shattered by more than five years of violent civil war, marred by
gross violations of human rights and massive war crimes on all sides. If the people ever
hope to move forward and rebuild their lives and their society, the state will need to
undergo a decidedly novel transitional process once the fighting finally stops. Syria will
have to reconcile a fractured state and address the presence of foreign fighters. There are
a myriad of other distinct challenges that must be addressed in order to move forward.
Once the violence ends, the work will have just begun.
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Chapter III: Research and Resolution
A Toolkit for Addressing Foreign Fighters in Syria
Syria is in a unique situation in regard to modern conflict. Foreign fighters are
engaged in conflict in the country on an unprecedented scale. If the Syrian people are to
have a complete and fruitful transitional justice program, the issue of foreign fighters
must be addressed. Unlike any other conflict, Syria has become a global conflict on a
local stage. While previous wars have involved foreign fighters, to varying degrees, no
conflict has involved so many actors from so many different countries. Due to this influx
of foreigners from a wide swath of states around the globe, the war crimes committed in
Syria have the potential to become an issue of global guilt. There have not been any truly
significant endeavors undertaken to address the presence of foreign fighters, as of yet.
There are, however, tools in the international realm that may allow the powers that be to
sort through the mess that has festered in Syria. Through the use of UN Commissions of
Inquiry (CoI) and fact-finding missions, peace negotiations, ICC, and other aspects of the
Rome Statute, there may be a toolkit that allows for the global community to address the
presence of foreign fighters in a conflict riddled with war crimes.
The OHCHR conducts fact finding missions in situations when gross human
rights abuses are thought to have occurred. Syria’s foreign fighter problem is an issue
that certainly meets the need for one of these missions. The OHCHR (2017) listed the
process behind the missions:
“United Nations mandated commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions and
investigations are increasingly being used to respond to situations of serious
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violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law,
whether protracted or resulting from sudden events, and to promote accountability
for such violations and counter impunity”
The nature of CoI, fact-finding missions, and investigations is based around the discovery
of what atrocities have been committed and by what groups. That makes these important
tools for a budding transitional justice process in respect to foreign fighters in Syria’s
war.
Establishing a commission of inquiry would not be that difficult to accomplish.
The UN already created “The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic” on August 22, 2011 by the Human Rights Council through
resolution S17/1. The CoI has a very relevant mission that could easily include a foreign
fighters initiative, it is summed up by OHCHR (2017) as follows:
“A mandate to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law
since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Commission was also tasked
to establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to such violations and of
the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a
view of ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may
constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable.”
There is an explicit purpose in the CoI’s mandate, which is to document war crimes and
atrocities and find those that committed them. Through interviews with victims and
witnesses, of which there have been more than 1,400, and the review of “photographs,
video recordings, satellite imagery, forensic and medical, reports from Governments and
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non-Governmental sources, academic analyses and United Nations reports” the
commission has compiled substantial evidence to achieve its stated mandate (OHCHR,
2017). In order for the commission to make a finding, it “requires that incidents be
corroborated to a level where the commission had ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that
the incidents occurred as described” (OHCHR, 2017). Approaching the investigation at
this level of scrutiny, from this many fronts, ensures that a large swath of war crimes
perpetrators can be identified, moving the prospect of a more complete transitional justice
process along substantially.
The CoI’s mandate to discover the nature of atrocities and those that have
committed them is a significant tool for the transitional justice arsenal in a post-conflict
Syria. Moreover, the mandate falls directly in line with the transitional justice mission
regarding foreign fighters. The only thing that would need to happen is the CoI would
need to be modified to add a codification that the identities of foreign fighters engaged in
atrocities be documented and prepared for a separate accountability process. The UN is
also the perfect venue through which to reach a consensus about how countries around
the world are going to deal with their respective foreign fighters. Due to the fact,
however, that the Syrian government has yet to allow the CoI to undertake investigations
inside the country, the scope of potential findings have been hampered. This hindrance
must be overcome in order to gain a fuller picture of what atrocities are being committed,
and whom is committing them. Allowing the commission to operate in-country could be
a significant step for the Assad regime to begin negotiating their position in the postconflict justice process. Using peace negotiations with the Assad regime will be a key
component of the country’s transitional justice process. This will be discussed in the next
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section. Utilizing negotiations as leverage could, however, be an important tool in
addressing the foreign fighter problem.
Peace negotiations have often been utilized to achieve goals that are pertinent to
the post-conflict reconciliation process. An agreement to end hostilities usually comes
with caveats that will allow for public acceptance of that peace, as was recently the case
in the Colombian government’s agreement with FARC. One of the most important
components of the Colombian negotiation involved a search for the disappeared. The
commitment to addressing the pervasive issues was outlines by Vice News, Daniels
(2015) wrote:
“Tuesday’s accord promises compensation for the victims as well as the creation
of an ‘Integral System of Truth, Justice Reparation and No Repetition” that is
supposed to provide a framework for the implementation of this as well as of
previous accords touching on the victims. They include an agreement to set up a
truth commission to establish who committed what atrocities, special tribunals to
give more lenient treatment to those who confess, and a pledge from both sides to
look for the disappeared.”
Utilizing the peace process to gain concessions such as this can be an important tool in
Syria’s transition. While many factions inside Syria’s conflict are extreme ideologues,
dedicated to absolute victory with no mention of a negotiated peace, there may still be
some room for discussion once these groups have been beaten back. Although groups
such as ISIS and al-Nusra Front have declared an intent for all-out victory, when their
backs are against the wall they may be willing to make concessions to avoid all-out
defeat.
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Linking the foreign fighter problem to peace negotiations could become an
important part of the toolkit in the post-conflict process. If a condition of peace is that all
parties turn over information on their respective foreign fighter populations then more
identities could be discovered for prosecution, reconciliation, and monitoring by their
home countries. While these groups may be reluctant to hand over their own members
for prosecution, they may be willing to agree to reconciliatory processes such as
reintegration and amnesty for a majority in return for information on the identities of key
figures. This leniency may not go over well with the Syrian people but discovering the
identities of these foreign fighters and the atrocities they committed will go a long way to
accomplishing many of the goals involved in the transitional justice process. The
identities of the fighters and the nature of their crimes can provide a significant boon to
achieving some elements of truth commissions, a major component of the reconciliation
process.
Offering a degree of amnesty may accomplish a significant amount in terms of
identifying foreign fighters involved in war crimes. This could also go a long way
toward eliminating some of the apprehension involved in prosecutions. Human Rights
Watch (2009) noted that the threat of looming prosecutions sometimes makes achieving
certain peacemaking goals difficult, and that amnesties can be useful. Utilizing a degree
of amnesty in order to achieve truth-seeking goals is something that will have to be
balanced with Syrian demands and minimal limits for justice. The mechanics of justice
will likely be achieved through the most established portion of the toolkit: the ICC.
The ICC is the most important tool for a successful transitional justice process in
Syria. Despite the lynchpin nature of the ICC, it is also the most difficult of all the tools
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to utilize in Syria’s case. The Rome Statute created the ICC in order to address
international crimes such as genocide and other war crimes (Rome Statute, 1998; UN,
2003). There are 124 countries that are parties to the Rome Statute (ICC, 2017). Only
states that are party to the Rome Statute fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, and Syria is
not one of those countries (Human Rights Watch, 2013b; Rome Statute, 1998). The
absence of Syria from the parties to the Rome Statute means that the war crimes
committed in Syria do not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. If Syria does not accept
the jurisdiction of the ICC, the only means by which the court could obtain said
jurisdiction would be through an “ICC Referral” (Human Rights Watch, 2013b). The
“ICC Referral” has to be approved by the UN Security Council, which has occurred only
in the case of Darfur in 2002 and Libya in 2011. As of yet the Security Council has been
hampered by “no” votes by Russia and China, leaving Syria out of play for the ICC
(Human Rights Watch, 2013b).
If Syria is to have a respectable and effective transitional justice process the ICC
must be included. Crucial to this aspect of the post-conflict transition is the acquiescence
of Russia and China’s “yes” votes on the drafting of Syria into the ICC. Russia’s
allegiance to the Assad regime makes exercise of the ICC extremely difficult, but
nonetheless extremely necessary. Key to addressing justice in Syria is convincing Russia
to come to the table. Bringing Russia into a consensus with the rest of the Security
Council regarding the ICC may also be a significant step toward bringing the Assad
regime into a more robust peace process, due to its connection with Russia. Securing
Russia’s vote has proven to be difficult. There are certain strategies, however, that may
prove fruitful in moving the dialogue forward. Negotiating some conditions with Russia,
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such as an easing of certain sanctions incurred by their actions in Crimea, may force the
country to reconsider its no vote. If not sufficiently motivated by a relief of sanctions,
negotiating certain amnesties for some Assad officials, and Russians involved in the
conflict, while ensuring the continuation of Syria’s current system of government
following a cessation of hostilities may be sufficient to bring Russia to the table. If
Russia is convinced that its interests in Syria will be maintained to an acceptable degree,
it may be possible to secure a vote in favor of the ICC. Convincing Russia may go a long
way toward acquiring a “yes” vote from China as well, as the country may resist being
the sole country on the council to “veto” the referral.
Russia and China’s apprehension makes drafting Syria into the jurisdiction of the
ICC difficult, however, if a negotiated settlement is not fruitful in gaining the countries’
support, there are other avenues. The Security Council can be overruled by the UN
General Assembly in the event that they deem the Security Council to have failed to
exercise its responsibility to maintain peace (Johnson, 2014; UN General Assembly,
1950). “Uniting for Peace” grants the General Assembly a higher degree of authority that
could be significant in Syria’s case, as mentioned in paragraph 1 of section 1A of
resolution 377A(V):
“1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears
to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making
appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in
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the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session
at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within
twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be
called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven [now nine]
members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations” (Johnson,
2014; UN General Assembly, 1950).
Given the situation in Syria, the Security Council could certainly be considered to have
failed “to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security,” especially considering Russia’s obvious stake in the Assad regime (UN
General Assembly, 1950). A UN report already deemed the government of the Syrian
Arab Republic to have utilized chemical weapons in violation of international law;
considering Russia’s ties to said government, it is easy to determine that the Security
Council has failed in its duty (United Nations, 2013). It is therefore imperative that, if
Russia and China refuse to agree to the drafting of Syria into the ICC, the UN General
Assembly utilize an emergency special session override the Security Council’s deadlock.
The ICC is a critical portion of the transitional justice process for Syria especially
in respect to addressing the issue of foreign fighters. There have, however, been some
significant resolutions passed by the UN that could be used as well. The UN and many of
its member states have adopted resolutions and laws that act to restrict and criminalize
membership/contributions to internationally recognized terror groups, as well as
international travel countries where intra-state conflict occurs (UN Security Council,
2001; UN Security Council, 2014).
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Extradition of foreign fighters to stand trial in the ICC is difficult. The Rome
Statute that established the ICC grants the court authority when the state of perpetrator of
the crime in question is unwilling or unable to prosecute said perpetrator, but national
extradition laws may hamper efforts to extradite to the court (Gupta, 2000). The sheer
global variety and magnitude of the foreign fighter population in Syria means that there
will be many countries, each with their own extradition laws with which the ICC will
need deal. However, under Part 9, Article 86 of the Rome Statute, states that are party to
the statute have a “general obligation to cooperate” with the ICC in “its investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the court” (Rome Statute, 1998). If Syria
were to be drafted into the jurisdiction of the court (either through Security Council vote
or General Assembly override) that means that all 124 countries that are party to the
statute would be compelled to cooperate. That obligation to cooperate would imply
extradition of suspected perpetrators to the ICC if the state itself is unwilling or unable to
prosecute the alleged perpetrators itself. Further, Part 9, Article 89, Item 1of the statute
states:
“The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person,
together with the material supporting the request outlined in article 91, to any
State on the territory of which that person may be found and shall request the
cooperation of that State in the arrest and surrender of such a person. States
Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure
under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender” (Rome
Statute, 1998).
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This provision states very clearly that states which are party to the statute shall act in
accordance with the requests for surrender of suspected perpetrators. International
agreements of this nature are not necessarily legally binding, and are difficult to enforce
if a state decides that it no longer wishes to participate. However, the intent that the
parties to the Rome Statute had was to comply with the content of the statute; and given
the near-universal condemnation of the crisis in Syria, as well as the concern over the
implications of its global nature, most countries would be more than likely to cooperate
in this aspect of the post-conflict justice process.
Transitional justice is by its very nature a complex and imperfect endeavor. There
is never total accountability, total reconciliation, or total closure; it is simply not possible.
The best that transitional justice can hope to accomplish is the mitigation of injustice.
People want to feel that their suffering did not go unnoticed by the world. With this
toolkit for addressing the foreign fighter problem the world can acknowledge not just the
suffering of the Syrian people, but the global role in their suffering. The solution is far
from perfect; two of the biggest players in the Syrian conflict (Russia and the US) are
signatories to the Rome Statute, but they have not ratified it, meaning they are not bound
to obey its terms.
This toolkit is not meant to be a comprehensive total solution, but merely a
guideline for how to begin to address the unprecedented global phenomena that is the
foreign fighter problem in Syria. First, the facts need to be codified and the perpetrators
and their crimes documented. Next, the global community must make every effort to
bring actors to the table through negotiated disclosures and other concessions. Then, the
ICC needs to draft Syria into jurisdiction and create the International Criminal Tribunal
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for the Syrian Arab Republic (ICTS) for the purpose of addressing violations of
international humanitarian law. Once investigations have identified potential perpetrators
the court must utilize the Rome Statute to compel extradition of alleged war criminals.
Following that, the international community must continue to work toward addressing
this pervasive issue.
The foreign fighter problem is one that impacts the global community, and there
are not yet enough tools to solve it. States around the world are already seeing the impact
that radicalized citizens can have. It would be in the best interest of the foreign fighters’
states of origin to address the problem in a substantive manner. The international
community must make it clear to all those that consider engaging in the violent tourism
that they cannot simply run home and hide after they have engaged in these acts. The
world must declare unequivocally that “if you come from anywhere, we will find you
anywhere.” This brand of global radicalism may be occurring on this scale for the first
time in Syria, but it will not be the last time that it happens.
The UN and countries the world over must expand on this toolkit and engage this
problem head on. Addressing this serves the purpose of protecting each nation’s
homeland, deterring future foreign fighter recruitments, and most importantly providing
justice to a people that have endured one of the worst crises in modern history. Foreign
fighters will not simply disappear nor should the world let them. More tools must be
developed, more concrete investigative procedures for identification of potential foreign
fighters, more measures to apprehend said fighters, and more means to smoothly extradite
the perpetrators to an internationally monitored criminal court. There is still much work
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to be done, but this toolkit should provide some measure of what the international
community already has at its disposal.
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Chapter IV: Discussion
Proposal for a Broader Syrian Post-Conflict Process
COMMUNITY LEVEL
The transitional justice process in Syria will not follow the same path of states
before it. Each justice process is unique, and Syria’s will be no different. Addressing
foreign fighters, while one of the most distinctive aspects of Syria’s process, is not the
sole issue facing the country. There are a myriad of challenges that make transitional
justice difficult, not the least of which is the fractured nature of the state. If Syria is to be
successful in the post-conflict era, the implementation of transitional justice must be
unconventional. The most likely successes will not come from state-sponsored
transitional justice, but from community-level reconciliation efforts. Personalized local
efforts can be undertaken to the benefit of the Syrian people. Syria can affect a positive
transitional justice process through exercising processes similar to the Gacaca Courts of
Rwanda and by engaging in comprehensive on-the-ground localized efforts.
Rwanda’s own terrible chapter in 1994 resulted in the death of 800,000 people,
the rape of 250,000 women, and the commission of countless other atrocities (Huyse &
Salter, 2008; Westberg, 2010). A hallmark of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was the
violence perpetrated by average people, where neighbors were killing neighbors. That
widespread commission of violence rendered much of what the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) meaningless to average Rwandans. The ICTR was
established to deal solely with the masterminds behind the genocide. With around
120,000 suspects imprisoned after the violence, there were too many for the judicial
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system to address (Westberg, 2010). Due to the personal need for many Rwandans to
feel a sense of justice, communities began to initiate Gacaca Courts, a Rwandan tradition
that came to represent “justice on the grass” or community-level reconciliation
(Westberg, 2010, p. 333). The process is based around truth and reconciliation, and is a
useful tool that can be implemented when a full-scale international justice process cannot
be undertaken and/or fails to do so effectively. The post-genocide Gacaca Courts in
Rwanda had five goals:
“establish the truth about what happened; accelerate the legal proceedings for
those accused of genocide crimes; eradicate the culture of impunity; reconcile
Rwandans and reinforce their unity; and use the capacities of Rwandan society to
deal with its problems through a justice based on Rwandan custom” (Westberg,
2010, p. 337).
Due to the deep divisions in Syrian society and the convoluted nature of the conflict, an
interpretation of the Gacaca Courts could be a useful tool in the Syrian transitional justice
process.
Engaging in a process like that of the Gacaca Courts would empower each
individual community in Syria to address transitional justice in their own way, tailored to
fit their needs. By initiating this process, the Syrian people can jumpstart a broader
transitional justice movement throughout the country. The program has been so
successful in Rwanda that not only have more than a thousand prisoners confessed to
crimes, but “the government has continued to expand and legitimize the process”
(Westberg, 2010, p. 338). Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts also brought about the first iterations
of institutional reform with a vetted judiciary. The local level control also gives
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communities a venue to address the deeply personal matter of gender justice in a more
intimate and neatly tailored process. Families may feel more comfortable confronting
issues of gender violence in a community process, but broader programs will have to be
initiated on the state-level in order to ensure justice for victims, given the taboo nature of
the subject. With few options available while Assad retains power, community actions
such as these are imperative to the execution of transitional justice.
Syria is in a protracted conflict with no clear outcome. The destruction that has
permeated Syrian society from all sides has made unilateral organized transitional justice
mechanisms difficult to impossible to implement. With an entangled assault from regime
forces, ISIS, al-Nusra Front, Kurdish groups, and multiple other groups, there is no clear
path to victory for any one party, and there is no fighting force that would be impartial or
innocent enough to implement an effective and fair transitional justice process. A
process similar to the Gacaca Courts of Rwanda could become an effective tool in
initiating localized transitional justice mechanisms of truth and reconciliation in Syria.
There is no telling when the situation in Syria will resolve itself completely, and towns
are frequently changing hands between the powers-that-be. In order for Syrians to
address the problems that have been born of this war, there must be ongoing transitional
justice. Implementing transitional justice, even low-level processes such as Gacaca Court
style community truth and reconciliation commissions, is far from easy, but it could be
useful.
Implementing transitional justice practices while the Syrian conflict is ongoing
could be useful in helping to heal the people trapped in the ongoing war. The Gacaca
process involves two phases, the first of which is information gathering (Westberg,
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2010). The information gathering process involves investigating accusations and truthseeking (Westberg, 2010; Huyse, 2008). This is an element of truth-commissions in
broader transitional justice, but is undertaken here on the community level, which could
be extremely useful in Syrian towns with neighbors looking to come together to heal.
The second phases of the process is that of the trial. Trials are held at different levels
depending on the severity of the crime in question, with less severe crimes happening in
communities between neighbors, and the most severe occurring in official civil courts
(Westberg, 2010). Instituting this tiered-trial system could go a long way in addressing
and mitigating certain crimes perpetrated throughout the Syrian conflict. Communities
would be able to put certain matters to bed, allowing them to begin the process of
healing, while separating them from crimes that need to be addressed in a more
systematic and formal manner. If the process of transitional justice has already been
initiated when the conflict winds down, then it will be much easier to sift through the
wreckage knowing that less severe matters have been handled, with more heinous crimes
filtered out for higher authority.
While transitional justice serves the post-conflict process, implementation during
an ongoing conflict is not unprecedented. ICTJ has been working in Afghanistan since
2003, through waves of violence. The work that ICTJ does in conflict zones could easily
lend itself to the situation in Syria. Things like documentation of abuses and promotion
of civil society missions are paramount to a successful transitional justice process, and
must be initiated during conflict (Kouvo, 2009). Instituting transitional justice measures
in the midst of conflict is a useful tool already in practice by one civil society group in
Syria.
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The Center for Civil Society and Democracy in Syria (CCSD) has instituted
several local measures in Syria. One of the most innovative transitional justice measures
that CCSD has put into place is the “I Am She” program, centered on female activism in
Syria. CCSD (2017) described the program as “a network of community-based women’s
groups or ‘peace circles’ led by Syrian women, working to reinforce effective political,
economic, social, and cultural participation of women in order to realize peace, freedom,
justice, representation, and transparency for all Syrians.” The program is put into
practice through the exercise of peace circles, which teach advocacy, organizing,
mobilization, and other training mechanisms to Syrian women in various provinces. The
program has been able to secure cease-fires, allowing assistance to the wounded, and has
provided a means for women to gain a significant role in Syria’s future (SyriaUntold,
2015). Processes such as the “I Am She” project are invaluable tools in combatting
gender-based violence, and empowering local communities in a besieged state. These
on-the-ground tools are the exact sort of transitional justice mechanisms that can make a
difference, not only in bringing about healing post-conflict, but also bringing
communities together in order to end the violence in the first place.
Localized measures during the midst of the war are Syria’s best hope yet to bring
some semblance of peace and stability to the fractured state. As it stands, Syria is mired
in an incredibly complex and violent conflict, with major powers incredibly ingrained in
the warfare. No matter the outcome of the fighting, someone will be left out of the
transitional justice process. The sheer number of forces involved in the conflict, and the
magnitude of accusations against all participants ensures that a state-run transitional
justice program will be incomplete at best, and farcical at worst. Every force involved
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has had accusations leveled against them, with the most successful being accused of the
most pervasive violations. If the Assad regime retains power, there is no plausible
scenario that Assad or any of those that stood by him throughout the conflict will be held
accountable on a national level; the leader would never allow that to happen. On an
international level, given Russia’s obvious allegiance to Assad, there is little hope that the
regime will be held accountable either. US-backed rebels, if successful, would likely be
largely exempt from criminal prosecutions, and the process would be catastrophically
hindered, just as the transitional justice process was for Iraq after US involvement
(Stover, Sissons, Pham, & Vinck, 2008). The presence of two of the world’s foremost
super powers (US and Russia) makes large-scale transitional justice measures involving
their proxies difficult to impossible, given each state’s respective power and authority
over global decisions through mechanisms such as the UN Security Council. The power
that Russia wields has already been evident in the Security Council, and the US’s
hegemonic authority lends credence to the idea that any action against the nation or its
allies in Syria would be miniscule or nonexistent.
The most effective action on the international scale will be against ISIS, al-Nusra
Front, and any other non-state actors that are not backed by international forces. The UN
and the ICC would be most effectively utilized in pursuing foreign fighters through the
process outlined in the previous section. Tackling the foreign fighter component is a
significant means by which the international community can do something to apologize
to the Syrian people for the lack of action over the last six years. An ideal situation
would see Assad toppled and prosecuted for his crimes, but in reality, in-state transitional
justice measures are going to have to be carried out by everyday people in towns and
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cities across Syria. If the Syrian people cannot get what they really want, an end to the
terrors of Assad, they are going to have to figure out some means of living with what they
have gone through, which is only accomplishable through local action. Communities
must come together to bridge divides and heal wounds. Peace circles, like those in
practice through “I Am She” must be utilized to activate average citizens, so that each
person can understand the stakes they have in reconciliation. Community courts, like that
of “Gacaca” must be developed and initiated so that the people in those communities are
able to live together with what has become an irrevocable part of their past.
STATE-LEVEL
The best case scenario for Syria’s future would be a situation in which Assad is
removed and transitional justice measures can be carried out on a state-wide level with no
exemptions for Assad’s forces. The removal of such a significant hurdle will allow
successful iterations of prosecutions and reconciliation, institutional reform, and
memorialization. With Assad out of power, Syrians could gain control of their postconflict process, taking back the reigns of that which was stolen from them during this
dark chapter in their history.
Trust in the impartiality of Syria’s court system is not high. With Assad at the
head of the government, the Syrian people will not receive a fair chance at justice. The
very reason for the current climate in Syria is the distrust that many had in Assad’s
government, and that sentiment has not dissipated over six years of fighting that has seen
many accusations of war crimes leveled against the regime. Several key elements of
transitional justice cannot proceed with Assad still in power. The paramount issue at play
is that of prosecutions and truth commissions. ICTJ (2009) identifies criminal
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prosecutions as “judicial investigations of those responsible for human rights violations.
Prosecutors frequently emphasize investigations of the “big ﬁsh”: suspects considered
most responsible for massive or systematic crimes” (p. 1). Assad and other members of
his regime are some prime examples of “big fish” in the scheme of the Syrian war, and
their removal is key to bringing criminal prosecutions some degree of legitimacy.
Assad’s removal from power would allow the international community to work
with the transitional Syrian government to initiate fully-fledged trials. The criminal
prosecutions of the Nuremburg trials were only able to come to fruition because the Nazi
leaders accountable for the war crimes in question were out of power following the end
of WWII. If Assad is removed from power, the international community can more
effectively prosecute those that engaged in human rights abuses. With the power
structure behind a large portion of the civil war removed, the community level, gacacainspired courts could work more effectively in concert with a rebuilt national court
system. While the Gacaca Courts are primarily a community-based mechanism, it did
operate on leveled tiers of legitimacy, offering an insight into how the Syrian judicial
system might tackle the issue of impartiality in the post-conflict arena. When selecting
judges for the process, “Rwandans elected 260,000 gacaca judges based on their moral
standing, integrity, and noninvolvement in the genocide” (Westberg, p. 338, 2010). This
selection process could lend itself to an expansion of the court’s reach, allowing higher
level prosecutions to operate under Syrian jurisdiction. Placing Syrians in control of this
process would grant them a greater connection to their post-conflict healing process.
The good that comes from domestic control of trials cannot be overstated. With a
vetted and rebuilt judiciary, the people of Syria can address the violence on their own
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terms. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) (2008) explained the benefits: “If
domestic prosecutions are possible, they can signal a break with the past, foster renewed
public trust in institutions and restore the dignity of victims. At the same time,
prosecutions generally face many hurdles and require significant resources and a high
commitment to fairness, transparency and public consultations” (p. 6). Syrian control of
the transitional justice judiciary process could bring about a positive reinvigoration of
important security institutions and provide justice for victims at the same time. This
utilization of a new iteration of Syria’s judiciary would also go a long way toward
rebuilding and reforming the state’s institutions, another key component of transitional
justice.
Reform of institutions is an important aspect of transitional justice. Utilizing a
mechanism similar to that of Rwanda’s could begin to rebuild the judiciary and establish
a cornerstone of the new government. The impact of rebuilding institutions in this
manner is two-fold, as noted by ICTJ (2014) “reform efforts can both provide
accountability for individual perpetrators and disable the structures that allowed abuses to
occur.” With the regime out of the picture, a rebuilt judiciary can begin reinstituting rule
of law and rebuilding public trust, and from that point other institutions can be rebuilt.
Once trust is once again returned to the public sphere through institutional reform, the
country can move forward with other aspects of transitional justice, uninhibited by the
presence of a repressive regime.
Another key element of post-conflict justice measures is that of memorialization.
Memory efforts involve truth seeking and tribute to victims. The primary goal of
memorialization efforts is the discovery and preservation of truth and its commitment to
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public memory in order to prevent atrocities of a similar nature from ever happening
again. Each society chooses to remember the past in different ways, often through public
instillations of remembrance, and museums. How Syria will choose to remember the
hundreds of thousands lost in their civil war is unique to them, but there are mechanisms
in place that could assist with the creation of these instillations.
The Rome Statute, which created the ICC, also established the Trust Fund for
Victims (TFV) which is dedicated to working in tandem with the court’s decisions
regarding victims (Mégret, 2010). The purpose of the TFV, according to the official TFV
(2017) website is to
“Support and implement programmes that address harms resulting from genocide,
crimes of humanity and war crimes. To achieve this mission, the TFV has a twofold mandate: (i) to implement Court-Ordered reparations and (ii) to provide
physical, psychological, and material support to victims and their families. By
assisting victims to return to a dignified and contributory life within their
communities, the TFV contributes to the realization of sustainable and longlasting peace through the promotion of restorative justice and reconciliation.”
The TFV is an international resource that can assist state-level mechanisms in order to
help victims. Providing reparations and other programs that can aid victims in moving
forward with their lives is an essential restorative measure. The TFV also works toward
rehabilitation services for victims which is another important element of remembrance:
working for those that are still here.
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INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
The TFV was created through the Rome Statute just like the ICC, which is the
most important element of the international level of transitional justice for Syria. The
court is the means by which the worst offenders will see justice. While Syria is not a
party to the Rome Statute, meaning the country is out of the court’s jurisdiction, they can
be drafted into it through the Security Council. As it stands today, the Security Council
has had difficulty reaching the required consensus to draft Syria under the courts
authority, but this can be avoided through intervention by the General Assembly under
the “Uniting for Peace” initiative, as mentioned in the previous section (UN General
Assembly, 1950).
Operating through the ICC, the international community can address the systemic
human rights abuses that have occurred over the course of the last six years in Syria.
Chief among the issues to be addressed by the court will need to be the high-level
offenders behind the atrocities in Syria. The crimes committed by the various factions
involved in the war must be addressed in order to provide some measure of justice to the
Syrian people. Another issue that will be extremely important for restorative measures in
Syria will be the prosecution of some element of the foreign fighter force involved in the
civil war. Under the Rome Statute, and through the “Uniting for Peace” initiative, this
aspect of transitional justice is possible. If Syria can be drafted into the ICC’s
jurisdiction, then all states that are party to the Statute could be compelled to turn over
their respective foreign fighters for prosecution in an international court.
The process will not be quick, nor will it be easy, but it will provide a measure of
justice. The international community has already acknowledged that some accountability
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must occur. The United Nations has, according to a report by Reuters (2017), established
a CoI with the intent of preparing for the prosecution of war crimes offenders in Syria.
Evidence gathering and case building are important aspects of the international
community’s role in Syria’s post-conflict process, but they must also make a commitment
to addressing the foreign fighter problem as a part of the total and complete judicial
undertaking. Syrians must feel that all perpetrators are held to some degree of
accountability, even when those perpetrators operated as an invading army.
Every level of the transitional justice process is important. The goal is not
reversing the tragedy but moving forward from it. The process does not heal all wounds,
but it allows people to live with the wounds that they have endured. Transitional justice
is an endeavor worth undertaking. Though processes such as reconciliation may seem to
many, if not most, like unsatisfactory concessions, a society cannot live with so much
unresolved violence. People have to come together to address what has happened to
them, even if the only thing they accomplish is that their neighbors and the world knows
their story. There is no such thing as a perfect transitional justice process. It is
impossible to completely repair something that has been so fractured by war, but it is
possible to bring the pieces back together. The hope is not that the process will bring
everything back to normal and return Syrian society to the peace it had before. The hope
is that enough of that peace and normalcy can be created so that the next generation can
move on, learning the lessons of the violence before, but uninhibited by the wounds it has
created.
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VI. Conclusion
Syria has a litany of issues to address in order to move on from the barbarism of
the country’s civil war. There have been widespread accusations of human rights abuses
by all sides in the conflict, hundreds of thousands have been killed, millions displaced,
and much of the country has been destroyed. Foreign fighters have poured into the
conflict on an unprecedented scale, unmatched in any conflict before. In order for the
victims of Syria’s war to move forward a unique iteration of transitional justice must be
undertaken. Community-level reconciliation is the most likely path forward for Syria due
to the fractured nature of the state. If Assad were to be removed from power, then
broader state-led measures could be undertaken. However, the likelihood of the regime
retaining power puts a complete state-level process in doubt. On the international level,
the UN must take action to overcome the roadblocks that have besieged the Security
Council and initiate CoI’s to determine the extent of war crimes committed in Syria.
Once Syria is drafted into the jurisdiction of the ICC then prosecutions can commence.
Under the authority of the Rome Statute, all states that are party to it could be compelled
to turn over their respective foreign fighters for prosecution by the ICC.
With Syria operating under a rebuilt judiciary, individual communities working
toward reconciliation, and the international community holding the masterminds of the
war, both foreign and domestic, accountable, there could be hope for a new dawn in
Syria. The wounds inflicted by the years of war will not be erased through transitional
justice, but they can be mitigated. Transitional justice will seek to pull the survivors out
of the darkness so that they may begin to try to return to a sense of normalcy. The path to
justice is often long and arduous, but that makes it no less necessary. It is an endeavor
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worth undertaking, if for no other reason than the fact that the moral arc of the universe
demands it.
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